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           Islamic feminism in Iran is defined as the radical rethinking of religious and sacred 
texts from a feminist perspective. The purpose of this research is to show how an Islamic 
feminist discourse developed in Iran, and to outline the differences between the reformist 
and traditionalist epistemological foundations of women’s rights discourse in Iran. 
           This study, using documentary research methods, demonstrates that central to the 
development of Islamic feminism is the development of the reformist movement in Iran.  
Moreover, it is shown that the main impedance to women’s equality in Iran is the 
traditionalist epistemology in religious law. While reformists believe that employing 
justice in Islamic law requires absolute equality regarding both men and women’s rights, 
traditionalists present a different interpretation of the notion of justice. According to the 
traditionalist discourse, since men and women have natural and inborn differences, two 
separate kinds of law are needed to regulate their lives. 
 
  
v 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS  
      CHAPTER                                                                                                             PAGE 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1 
Introduction ........................................................................................................1 
                      Significance and Importance ..........................................................................6 
                      Literature Review ...........................................................................................8 
                            Feminist Movements in Iran ....................................................................8 
                            Islamic Feminism in the Middle East ......................................................9 
                            Islamic Feminism in Iran .......................................................................10 
                            Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran .................11 
                            Reformist Discourse...............................................................................12 
                            Traditionalist Discourse .........................................................................13 
                            Neo-traditionalist Discourse ..................................................................14 
                            Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist ........15 
                            Discourse 
                      Methodology ................................................................................................16 
II. ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN IRAN.....................................................................24 
                     Feminist Movements in Iran .........................................................................24 
                     Islamic Feminism in the Middle East ...........................................................27 
                     Islamic Feminism in Iran ..............................................................................31 
   Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran ........................33 
III. MAIN DISCOURSES PERTAINING TO ISLAMIC FEMINISM ................38 
IN IRAN 
                     Reformist Discourse......................................................................................38 
                     Traditionalist Discourse ................................................................................47 
                     Neo-traditionalist Discourse .........................................................................51 
                     Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist ...............55 
                     Discourse 
IV. DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................65 
     Discussion and Conclusion .........................................................................65 
V. LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................82
vi 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction: 
After the Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran, a religious government took control over 
Iranian society. The Islamic republic of Iran ordained a set of Islamic laws and compelled 
people to obey an official interpretation of Islam, which was announced by clergies at the 
highest powerful position in the political structure of Iran. This official monolithic 
interpretation of Islamic texts has put Iranian women in a difficult situation, as they have 
been deprived of some parts of their citizen rights and have been confronted with 
limitations regarding their presence in public places.   
In recent decades, Iranian secular activists, mostly living in Western countries, have tried 
to build support for Iranian women’s rights. They have tried to regain rights for women 
lost through the re-Islamization policies of the Islamic government in Iran. Although these 
activities were slightly successful in publicizing Iranian women’s circumstances to the 
world, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom for women and 
restoring their rights inside Iran (Ahmadi 2006). The main reason for these unsuccessful 
attempts is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has labeled secular discourses as anti-Islamic 
discourses, and hence has prevented their development in Iranian religious culture. 
Moreover, like other Islamic countries in the Middle East, secular discourses could not be 
accepted by the majority of the Iranian population, who are Muslims and follow their rights 
within Islamic discourse. Hence, it seems that a religious movement from inside the 
country was needed to change the dominant discourse presented by the government and 
help Iranian women attain their rights as full citizens. This movement has started in recent 
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decades in Iran, with the purpose of reinterpreting religious sources from a non-
traditionalist perspective and presenting an egalitarian interpretation of Islamic scriptures. 
Iranian Muslim feminists have presented their feminist discourse within an Islamic context. 
However, their interpretation of religious and sacred texts on women’s issues is different 
from that of official clergies. Muslim feminists have demanded alterations in the traditional 
interpretation of sacred texts and consequently modifications to Islamic laws extracted 
from religious sources.  Traditional jurists, who were responsible for extracting Islamic 
law from sacred texts and held absolute power over state institutions, did not tolerate any 
reformist voices outside of dominant traditionalist discourse. With the expansion of 
feminist activism, Muslim feminists have been confronted with problems imposed by the 
Iranian government as the main supporter of traditionalist discourse of Islam. These 
problems have caused social and political burden for feminist activists, as well as academic 
scholars (Najmabadi 1995). Thousands of women put their lives, their careers, and their 
families in danger fighting for recognition as full citizens and restoring their human rights 
(Ahmadi 2006). In this political condition, some other feminists preferred to leave the 
country and choose a lonely life in exile rather than living under the rules of the Islamic 
Republic.  
However, unlike the existing problems, and barriers that were put in the way of feminist 
activists by the Islamic government, Iranian Muslim feminists could exhibit admirable 
resistance against governmental pressures. They could develop a new discourse on 
feminism and Islam, challenging dominant fundamental discourse supported by traditional 
jurists. As a result of their endeavors, Islamic feminism, as a movement, has increasingly 
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become mainstream in Iran. Islamic feminism is defined here as the radical rethinking of 
religious and sacred texts from a feminist perspective. Reformist and feminist thinkers in 
Iran have tried to present a new interpretation of sacred texts in order to combat repressive 
policies and to advocate for equal legal rights. This new approach includes not only 
reinterpretation of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), but also reinterpretation of shariʼa1 
(Maqasid al-shariʼa) as the principal foundation of Islamic law. This movement of 
reinterpreting Islamic principles from a feminist perspective was so unprecedented in the 
Islamic world that it led Ziba Mir-Hosseini to remark, “The doors opened to a new 
interpretation and new thinking of religious and sacred texts in Iran, in a new scale that is 
unparalleled in the history of Islamic law” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 12).  
Various political, economic, and social factors have influenced the development of Islamic 
feminism in Iran. The processes of globalization have brought awareness of various 
political interpretations of women’s rights discourses around the world and helped women 
to rethink their own society’s policies and norms (Tohidi 2002: 1). The processes of 
globalization have linked the Iranian situation to a global struggle for freedom based on a 
gender rights discourse emerging from Western societies. In particular, postmodernism has 
helped Iranian Muslim feminists rethink gendered Islam (Ahmadi 2006). Notwithstanding 
the impact of Western feminism on the Iranian discourses, central to the development of 
Islamic feminism is the development of the reformist movement in Iran. Iranian reformism 
1 “The shariʼa in its popular usage indicated the religion of Islam, God`s true religion as it embodies 
revelation in praxis” (Sachedina 1999a: 15). Therefore, it is perceived as a part of revelation (wahy); while, 
fiqh is a part of religious science whose aim is to recognize and bring out shariʼa legal rules from Islamic 
sacred sources: the Qurʼan and Sunna. Fiqh is a legal science with its own methodology and legal theories 
(usul-al fiqh theories); this science was developed by fuqahaʼ during the centuries in dialogue with other 
religious and non-religious sciences. In other words, shariʼa is sacred and eternal while fiqh is a human 
science and subject to change.   
3 
 
                                                          
aims not only to review Islamic laws regarding various aspects of human life (including 
women’s issues), but also to challenge the philosophical foundation of these laws from a 
modern and postmodern perspective. From this foundation, the women’s movement can be 
categorized within the reformist movement, which began in late nineteenth century Iran 
(Mir-Hosseini 2002; Tohidi 2006).   
The objective of Iranian Islamist feminism is the pursuit of equality and justice in Islamic 
law on gender issues (Lorestani 2003).  Iranian Islamist feminists challenge traditional 
jurists by presenting new discourses underlying Islamic legal thought. These discourses 
can be divided into two types: neo-traditionalist and reformist. While neo-traditionalist 
discourse was almost successful in restoring women’s rights, the greater possibility for 
greater women’s rights in Iran is more likely through the language of reformism (Mir-
Hosseini 2001). Reformist discourse, in contrast to neo-traditionalist discourse, sees 
women’s sexuality as regulated by social circumstances and not by Divine will. Reformist 
discourse claims gender inequality embedded in Islamic laws as a societal construction by 
male jurists that is neither sacred nor fixed, and rather is human and subject to contestation. 
Both reformist and traditional thinkers believe that Islam is a religion of fairness and 
justice. They both see in the shariʼa equality for both genders, however they reach different 
conclusions in applying Islamic laws from the shariʼa. The tension between these two 
groups in interpreting the shariʼa is a matter of perspective with regards to a discourse of 
rights. Do humans have inalienable rights or are rights mutually reciprocal communitarian 
duties? Reformists speak of “human rights,” while traditionalists speak of “human duties”. 
Also, while reformists believe that employing fairness and justice in Islamic laws requires 
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absolute equality regarding both men and women’s rights, traditionalists present a different 
interpretation of the notion of justice. They believe that Islamic law is fair toward both 
genders, but this fairness does not mean proportional equality. From a biological 
perspective, women and men have some natural and inborn differences that demand 
different considerations regarding their rights and duties. Because men and women are 
different, two separate kinds of laws are needed to regulate their lives. Only by 
acknowledging these biological differences can true justice toward women be achieved. 
Reformism seeks to further develop this line of thinking to advocate for women’s rights 
rather than challenging this epistemology with the introduction of an antithetical Western 
rights discourse. 
This research will focus on epistemological and philosophical foundations of the reformist 
and traditional discourses underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran. The two main questions 
my research will answer are: 
How has an Islamic feminist discourse in Iran developed from the reformist movement? 
What are the epistemological foundations of traditional and reformist discourses regarding 
women’s issues and gender rights? 
This research is organized into four chapters. The first chapter will cover the introduction, 
significance and importance of the study, methodology, and literature review. The second 
chapter will present a review of Islamic feminism in Iran and other Islamic countries. Also, 
it will discuss the influences of various factors, including reformist ideas, on the 
development of Islamic feminism in Iran. The third chapter will include reformist, neo-
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traditionalist, and traditionalist interpretations of women’s issues. It will also discuss recent 
updates in traditionalist discourse on women’s rights. The forth chapter will examine the 
issue of justice, gender roles, and women’s rights in both reformist and traditionalist 
epistemologies. Moreover, it will discuss the differences of philosophy and epistemology 
of traditionalist and reformist discourses in interpreting religious texts and sacred sources.   
Significance and Importance:  
The main reasons for traditional interpretation of Islamic legal thought on women’s rights 
in Iran can be classified into three categories: ideological, political and epistemological. 
The ideological perspective focuses on the patriarchal structure of Islamic law. The 
political perspective focuses on the exclusion of women in the process of interpreting 
religious texts. The epistemological perspective questions the traditional assumptions 
underlying the interpretation of shariʼa and fiqh. Patriarchy has certainly influenced jurists’ 
worldview in their interpretation of religious texts. This has excluded women from the 
processes of interpreting Islamic law. Recently, however, globalization has interconnected 
global discourses on gender rights and women’s issues. The consequences of this will be 
profound on the development women’s rights Iran. Already, we are seeing an increasing 
presence of women in educational, political and social structures of Iran in recent decades. 
The number of women in higher education has increased dramatically in recent years 
(Bahrami and Etemadi 2013). In recent years, there has been an increase in women entering 
the Iranian workforce (Ibid). From 2006 to 2011, we witnessed a 6 percent increase in the 
number of female employees in both governmental and private companies (Khosroshahi 
2014). Moreover, women have demonstrated great interest in working in women-oriented, 
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this regard, the number of NGOs run by 
women has significantly increased within the last decades2. In tandem, there have been 
reformist endeavors in the Iranian parliament to legislate laws in order to improve women’s 
conditions within the family and provide employment protections (Mir-Hosseini 2002). 
Indeed, past decades observed a flourishing progress in women’s social, cultural and 
intellectual productions in Iran. After the Islamic revolution of Iran, in contrast to the 
deepest fear of the Islamic government from the activities of secular feminists, women not 
only were not disappeared from public places, but also they could achieve much success in 
their private and public lives; women had a considerable presence in educational and 
industrial organizations, artistic creations, professional occupations and even sports 
activities (Najmabadi 1995: 52). 
Therefore, it seems that increasing the visible presence of women in social and political 
life will eventually erode the patriarchal legal structure and empower women through 
progressive legislation.  
Despite social and political gains for Iranian women in recent years, the main impedance 
to women’s equality is traditionalist epistemology in religious law. Women are still 
excluded from interpreting religious and sacred sources. The development of Islamic law 
is still controlled by traditional jurists, despite reformist gains in recent years. Traditional 
jurists have made modifications in some parts of Islamic law concerning women’s rights 
in recent decades. However, the majority of Islamic laws on gender rights and women’s 
2  For further review, see “Zanane tarikhe moasere Iran dar chahardahe akhir, ghesmate dovom” (Iranian 
Women in Recent four decades, Part two), Pegah Houzeh, 07/26/2008, 
http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine 
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issues has remained unchanged. Indeed, the conflict between reformists and traditionalists 
is based upon a fundamental difference of the underlying philosophy of women’s role 
based on the conceptions of rights and duties and corresponding notions of justice and 
equality. Significant progress in changing Islamic law regarding women’s issues and 
gender rights will not be achieved until the foundation of traditionalist discourses is 
challenged. In summary, this research will outline the duality of reformist and traditionalist 
epistemological foundations of women’s rights discourses in Iran.  
Literature Review: 
Feminist Movements in Iran: 
Feminist activism in Iran is classified into two major groups: secular and Islamic. Because 
of political pressure in Iran in the early years of Islamic revolution, feminist activism was 
mostly restricted to the activities of secular women outside of Iran. Najmabadi (1995), 
Moghisi (1999), and Ahmadi (2006) describe the suffering conditions for women after the 
Islamic revolution in Iran. Najmabadi (1995) calls those years, “yeas of hardship, years of 
growth.”  
While secular activists in and outside of Iran have tried to regain women’s political and 
social rights, as well as draw the attention of the international world to the suffering 
situation of Iranian women, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom 
for women inside Iran as an Islamic country. Ahmadi (2006) refers to the reasons for the 
secular activists’ lack of success in restoring women’s rights in Iran.  
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On the other hand, the Islamic feminist movement could achieve more success than the 
secular feminist movement in bringing freedom for women in Iran. Iranian Muslim women 
have accepted Islamic feminist discourse as an authenticate source for expressing their 
political and social demands, as well as for requesting equal rights in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Muslim feminists have tried to oppose the clergy’s monolithic readership of Islam; they 
have challenged the traditional interpretation of Islamic theological and legal sources to 
present a new tendency in Islamic feminism. Ahmadi (2006) and Najmabadi (1995) 
describe the process of the development of Islamic feminism in the past decades in Iran. 
Mir-Hosseini (1996, 1998, 2003) mostly mentions the philosophical foundations of Islamic 
feminist discourse, which was supported by traditional jurists at the top of the political 
hierarchy Iran, and their conflict with traditionalist discourse. She also describes the 
similarities between reformist discourse and Islamic feminist discourse, as well as the 
major differences between reformists and traditionalists in their interpretation of Islamic 
law regarding gender roles and women’s issues.  
Islamic Feminism in the Middle East: 
Islamic feminism is not only restricted to Iran. We can witness the development of feminist 
movements in other Islamic countries in the Middle East. Karam (2011: 202) classifies 
feminist movements in the Middle East and Arab countries into three streams in a 
continuum: secular, religious, and Islamic. She describes the characteristics of these three 
movements in the Arab World and their relation to one another. She mentions that barely, 
in the Middle East and Arab World, is there any admiration and verification from religious 
circles for those working outside of these circles, like secular activists. Indeed, secular and 
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religious feminist movements had less success in restoring women’s rights in Arab 
countries in comparison with the Islamic feminist movement.  
Mehrangiz Kar (1993) discusses that like other Islamic countries in the Middle East, the 
feminist movement was a very marginal issue among followers of religions other than 
Islam. Also, the secular feminist movement in Iran could not attain more success in 
bringing freedom for women. Islamic feminism was the most powerful means to 
advocating for women’s rights in Iran, which was the same as in other Islamic countries. 
However, Islamic feminism in Iran has considerable differences from Islamic feminism in 
the Arab World. Mir-Hosseini (1996, 2003) refers to these differences between Muslim 
feminists in Iran and other Islamic countries in their interpretation of religious texts and 
extracting Islamic law from sacred sources.  
Islamic feminism in Iran: 
Bardan (2002) provides a general definition of Islamic feminism, and Moghissi (1999) 
mentions various characteristics of Islamic feminism in Islamic countries. Mir-Hosseini 
(1996) and Esposito (1998) talk about differences between Islamic feminism in Iran and 
other Islamic countries. They say that Muslim feminists in Iran demanded not only the 
rethinking of Islamic legal sources, but also the reinterpretation of sacred texts from a 
feminist perspective. To develop their feminist discourse, Iranian Muslim women applied 
their life experiences as women to their interpretation of sacred texts, as well as their 
independent research in various religious sources. Ahmadi (2006) and Bardan (2002) 
mention the main methodologies used by Iranian Muslim women in developing Islamic 
feminist discourse in Iran.  
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Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran: 
We can classify various factors that influenced the development of Islamic feminism in 
Iran into three main groups: the reformist movement, postmodern theories, and the 
globalization of women’s struggle for freedom. Mir-Hosseini (1996) and Tohidi (2006) 
discuss how Iranian Muslim feminists employed reformist ideas in their discussion of 
women’s rights and gender roles in Islam. They believe that Islamic feminist discourse in 
Iran has actually emerged from within the reformist discourse.  
Amir Arjomand (2004) and Ahmadi (2006) talk about the influences of postmodern 
theories on the development of Islamic feminism in Iran. Amir Arjomand believes that the 
Islamic feminist movement in Iran is a modern movement using modern and postmodern 
ideas in its discourse. Ahmadi provides examples of using postmodern conceptual tools by 
Iranian Muslim feminists in their discussion of women’s issues in Islam. For instance, 
through employing postmodern critiques of language in their discussion, Iranian Muslim 
feminists could unveil the role of Arabic language in maintaining a gender-biased 
interpretation of sacred sources.  
In addition to the reformist movement and postmodern ideas, the globalization of women’s 
challenges for equality and justice paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to develop 
their own feminist discourse. Awareness of various interpretations of women’s rights 
brought on by the processes of globalization for Iranian Muslim feminists has helped them 
to rethink their own society’s policies and norms. Tohidi (2006) discusses how the 
processes of globalization made Iranian feminists familiar with feminist movements in 
Western and Islamic countries.  
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Reformist Discourse: 
Islamic feminist discourse in Iran can be classified as a part of the reformist discourse. New 
interpretations of sacred texts from a modern perspective, which was presented by Iranian 
Muslim reformers, paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to demand reformulating 
Islamic laws on women’s issues from a feminist perspective.  
While most of reformist intellectuals in Iran have not subscribed to the gender equality 
discourse, their reformist theories on the interpretation of sacred texts and Islamic 
knowledge have enabled Iranian religious women to attune their faith with their feminist 
ideas. 
Iranian reformists have gathered at the Kiyan Institute, an intellectual and cultural institute 
in Tehran, around Abdolkarinm Soroush. Soroush’s reformist theories stimulated Iranian 
Muslim feminists to discuss of women’s rights in Islam and propose the necessity of 
reinterpreting sacred texts from a feminist perspective. Indeed, among various reformist 
ideas, Soroush’s theories had the most influence on shaping Iranian feminist discourse. 
One of his most influential ideas on shaping Iranian Islamic feminism was his discussion 
about the meaning of essential and accidental in Islam. Soroush (1989, 1999) separates 
essential parts of the Qurʼan, which are unchangeable and everlasting, from accidentals, 
which are subject to change and contestation. He confirms that essential parts of sacred 
texts include the core message of religion, while accidentals are the events that have taken 
place in the history of Islam. These historical events must not be taken as the spirit of Islam. 
Soroush (1995, 2000) believes that we should pay attention to the historical and contextual 
background of the Qurʼan in our interpretation of sharia’ and Islamic law.  
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In another reformist theory, known as the “expansion of Prophetic experience,” Soroush 
(1999) describes how the prophet’s disciples expanded his religious experience in the 
history and developed Islamic knowledge. He argues that the Islamic knowledge expanded 
by the prophet’s disciples must also be taken into account as the main sources of Islamic 
law. Hence, Islamic laws are not immutable, since they are not only based on what was 
stated in the Qurʼan and Sunna. 
Other reformers, like Alavitabar (2003) and Amirarjomand (2002), expand Soroush’s 
theory about the accidentals of history to a vast degree, which covers most parts of sacred 
texts. Hence, they believe majority of sacred texts are to be reinterpreted from a modern 
perspective in order to be employed to the present time.  
Traditionalist Discourse: 
Traditionalist discourse was developed by jurists on the basis of the biological differences 
between men and women. In this discourse, gender inequality is taken for granted. 
Women’s rights have no place in traditionalist discourse and gender relations are based on 
women’s duties. Mir-Hosseini (2003) declares that, in traditionalist discourse, women are 
seen as sexual beings, not as social beings; the only domain in traditionalist discourse in 
which women’s rights are partly discussed is the family law. She talks about gender-biased 
assumptions underlying traditionalist discourse, as well as the traditional interpretation of 
family laws proposed by jurists in Iran.  
Also, traditionalist discourse reflects social and cultural circumstances of the society in 
which traditional jurists had lived. The patriarchal structure in that society shaped the 
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worldview of classical jurists in their understanding of sacred texts. Ahmed (1992) and 
Mernissi (1991) discuss the influences of the patriarchal structure on the thinking modes 
of classical jurists. 
The ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi are a representative of traditionalist discourse in 
contemporary Iran. His opinions are in line with the policies of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran on women’s rights and gender roles. Moreover, present traditional jurists usually refer 
to his theories in their discussions on women’s issues. His interpretation of gender relations 
and women’s rights in Islam has been published in Tahura magazine (2008). 
Neo-traditionalist Discourse: 
Another discourse underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran is the neo-traditionalist, or 
modern, discourse. Neo-traditional jurists tried to find a solution for modern problems that 
emerged in Islamic countries because of the changed status of women. 
Mir-Hosseini (1999) and Siddiqi (1952) discuss how neo-traditionalists tried to resist 
against the emergence of Western values in Islamic countries, as well as support for gender 
equality in Islamic law. In this regard, Mir-Hosseini (2003) explains how neo-
traditionalists changed the gender-biased assumptions and theories underlying classical 
fiqh texts.  
The theories of complementarity of gender rights and duties and the naturalness of shariʼa 
law, which was first proposed by Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (1991), has been used by 
jurists as the main foundation of neo-traditionalist discourse. In this regard, Mutahhari’s 
interpretation of women’s rights, which was developed in his book, The System of Women’s 
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rights in Islam (1991), is representative of the interpretation of women’s rights in neo-
traditionalist discourse.   
Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist Discourse: 
While traditional jurists changed the form of some parts of fiqh rules on gender issues, they 
have mostly remained faithful to the classical interpretation of fiqh texts. Not only have 
neo-traditional jurists followed Mutahhari’s ideas (1991) on women’s rights in Islam, but 
also traditional jurists applied his theories in their arguments for gender roles and women’s 
rights in Islam.  
The ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi are a representative of traditionalist discourse in 
contemporary Iran. His interpretation of gender relations and women’s rights in Islam has 
been published in Tahura magazine (2008). He provides a rationalization for the traditional 
interpretation of classical fiqh texts. He explains the meaning of rights and duties in Islam. 
Moreover, he describes various conditions and circumstances under which an Islamic law 
on gender issues can be modified. Indeed, traditionalist discourse mostly remained faithful 
to the gender-biased assumptions underlying Islamic legal thought. Traditional jurists 
focused on the literal meaning of sacred texts, and did not consider the meaning of contexts 
in their interpretation of religious sources. 
However, as mentioned before, neo-traditionalist discourse changed the gender-biased 
assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts, and adopted the theory of naturalness of 
shariʼa law. Neo-traditionalists employed the findings of human sciences in their 
interpretation of religious sources, although their usage of modern theories in their analysis 
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of gender relations was selective. Reformist discourse, in contrast to traditionalist and neo-
traditionalist discourse, did not rely on the literal meaning of verses in sacred texts, and 
adopted a contextual and historical interpretation of religious sources. Reformers used 
hermeneutic approach in their analysis of sacred texts. They did not accept gender-biased 
assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts as valid and reliable assumptions. Also, their 
usage of modern theories, in their discussions for women’s rights in Islam, was not 
selective. 
Methodology:  
This research is based on documentary and library archival research. Documentary 
research methods include analysis of documents that contain information about the 
phenomenon we wish to study (Bailey, 1994). This type of research is used to investigate 
and categorize physical sources, namely written documents, whether in the private or 
public domain (Payne and Payne, 2004), such as official statistics or published research 
(Majdfar, F, 2003). Accordingly, this research will focus on various documents, including 
publications, academic papers, published interviews, official statistics and written books in 
the field of women’s studies and gender rights. Other sources will include feminist 
documents published outside of Iran, mostly written by Muslim feminists working in 
Western academic institutions, and also documents published in national and local 
academic archives in Iran.  
With the dominance of the empiricist and positivist perspective in the field of research 
methods in human sciences, researchers generally intended to collect data for their research 
projects through implementing surveys. Mainstream research tradition in human sciences 
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in general, and social sciences in particular, emphasizes quantitative research methods. 
Therefore, other research methods, like documentary methods, have almost been 
overlooked by scientists and researchers. Most parts of textbooks on research methods 
belong to discussions about traditional research methods, like interviews, surveys, and 
participant observation, and there is little space for discussion about other research 
methods, like documentary and library methods (Scott 1990: 1). Indeed, the documentary 
research method has not generally been recognized by scientists as an accepted 
independent research method, which can be used as the main or principle method in a 
project. This method is usually used by researchers to supplement data collected from 
traditional research methods, like surveys and in-depth interviews. This is because it is 
supposed that for producing something original, the data must be new. However, we can 
also do an original research using old data (Hakim 1982). While traditional research 
methods like surveys and interviews have already been tested and have been proved as 
respected scientific methods, they are not the only available ones, nor are they more 
convenient and cost effective than other methods. Research shows that the documentary 
method is as good and sometimes even more cost effective than traditional research 
methods (Mogalakwe 2009). Indeed, the documentary method is a reliable and acceptable 
research method, which follows scientific rules and requires strong adherence to research 
ethics (Ibid). 
The documentary and library method is used when a researcher intends to study past events 
or study the occurrence of present events he/she cannot personally eyewitness. At this time, 
documentary sources provide “mediate or indirect access,” as opposed to “proximate or 
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direct access,” to the events and practices that are to be studied (Scott 1990). When you 
have to refer to past events or you cannot directly witness whole parts of present events 
you wish to study, it becomes necessary to have indirect access to those events through 
reviewing related documents. In contrast, proximate or direct access to the required data 
for research is provided mostly through implementing traditional research methods, like 
interviews and participant observation.   
A document can be defined as an artifact, which includes an inscribed text. A document is 
a written text, which is produced by individuals or groups during their everyday practices 
(Scott 1990). It can be considered independent from its writer or the context of its 
production (Jary and Jary 1991). There are two kinds of documents used in the 
documentary and library research method: primary documents and secondary documents. 
Primary documents have been written by people who directly experienced an event and 
provided their eyewitness accounts of the event we intend to study. Secondary documents 
have been produced by those who did not directly experience the occurrence of events; 
they were not present in the scene and have received or read eyewitness accounts of an 
event (Bailey 1994: 194). For instance, the research studies done by Ziba Mir-Hosseini on 
Iranian Islamic feminism, including her interviews with traditional and neo-traditional 
jurists, as well as reformist scholars, are among primary documents. Studies done by Haleh 
Afshar, Nayereh Tohidi, Mahboobeh Sharuiat-Razavi on Islamic feminism in other 
Muslim countries, development of reformist discourse in Iran, the future of Islamic 
feminism, and Islamic perspectives toward women’s issues are all among secondary 
sources.  
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Data collected from the documentary method should be handled scientifically the same 
way as gathered data in other research methods. Scott (1990: 19-35) has introduced quality 
control criteria for handling data collected through the documentary research method. 
These criteria include authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. These 
criteria are interdependent and a researcher should regard all of them to ensure the high 
quality of documentary sources. Authenticity refers to whether a document has integrity, 
is genuine, and is of trustworthy and reliable origin. The researcher must be sure that the 
evidence he or she is consulting is exactly what it appears or purports to be.  
Regarding the authenticity of documents in this research, I have relied on those documents 
that were published by dependable research institutes and organizations in and outside of 
Iran. For instance, I have referred to the interviews of reformists and jurists on women’s 
issues, which have been published by reliable research centers like Islamic Propagation 
Office of Qom Seminaries and Kiyan magazine in Tehran. Also, I have referred to 
discussions about the various aspects of Islamic feminism published in dependable 
international academic journals, as well as reliable national academic journals, Iran. 
Credibility of information refers to whether a document is free from distortion and error. 
The researcher must be assured that the evidence he or she is consulting is factual. He or 
she must be assured that the document was not intentionally altered to mislead the 
researcher nor was it prepared for the special benefit of the researcher. Regarding the issue 
of credibility in this research, I have avoided using reporters’ opinions and analyses about 
the reformist and traditional discourse, gender relations, and women’s issues published in 
national newspapers or broadcasted in TV programs. This is because TV programs and 
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national newspapers in Iran have been accused of altering documents for their political 
purposes. Rather, to establish the credibility of research, I have used documents published 
by independent researchers and independent research institutes, which were not involved 
in fraudulent activities to distort information for their benefits.  
Representativeness refers to whether the document that has been chosen for the research is 
representative of the totality of the pertinent documents. In other words, it refers to whether 
the consulted document is typical of its kind. This research talks about the influences of 
reformist discourse on the development of Islamic feminism in Iran, as well as the 
contention between reformist and traditional discourses on women’s issues. As a 
representative reference of the reformist discourse, I have referred to Soroush’s3 theories. 
His ideas of “essentials and accidentals in religion”, “expansion of Prophetic experience”, 
“maximal and minimal religiosity”, and “historical and contextual interpretation of sacred 
texts” have shaped the basic foundations of reformist discourse Iran. Some reformists have 
proposed similar ideas and some others have developed Soroush’s theories within the 
reformist discourse. Also, Soroush’s reformist ideas have been greatly used by Iranian 
Muslim feminists in developing Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. Iranian Muslim 
feminists proposed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from a feminist perspective 
based on the new ideas developed by Soroush and his companions within the reformist 
discourse. Hence, Soroush’s ideas can be seen as the representative of reformist discourse, 
which have greatly influenced the development of Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. As a 
3 TIME magazine proclaimed Soroush among the 100 most influential people in the world in 2005, and in 
2008, Prospect magazine proclaimed him the seventh most influential intellectual in the world. 
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representative of neo-traditionalist and traditionalist discourse, I mostly referred to 
Ayatollah Motahhari’s and Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s opinions. Mutahhari was one of 
the most famous Shiʼa jurists in the pre-revolutionary and the early years of Islamic 
revolution in Iran. He mainly expressed his ideas about gender relations and women’s 
rights in his book, The System of Women’s rights in Islam, which was followed by the 
majority of contemporary jurists in Iran as the reference of their discussion for women’s 
rights in Islam. Most traditional, as well as neo-traditional, jurists have accepted 
Mutahhari’s definition and explanation of human rights in general and women’s rights in 
particular in Islam. Also, I have referred to Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s ideas as a 
representative of traditionalist discourse on women’s rights in contemporary Iran. 
Ayatollah Makarem has accepted Ayatollah Mutahhari’s standpoint on women’s rights and 
gender relation. Although his opinions are mostly defined within the traditionalist 
discourse, which considers Islamic law eternal and immutable, he considers the possibility 
of modification in Islamic laws under the specific kinds of conditions. He defines three sets 
of conditions under which an Islamic law can be modified. Therefore, at least a few aspects 
of his opinions can also be classified within the neo-traditionalist discourse, which 
considers the possibility of change in Islamic law according to the current demands of 
society. On the other hand, his opinions are in line with the government’s policies on 
women’s rights and gender issues. The Islamic government of Iran defends the definition 
of women’s right in traditionalist discourse, as opposed to its definition in the reformist 
discourse.  
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The forth criterion in assessing the quality of a document relates to the meaning of the 
document. Meaning refers to whether the document is comprehensible and clear. The final 
purpose of investigating a document is to understand the significance and meaning of what 
the document contains (Scott 1990: 28). A document can have two kinds of meaning: literal 
or face value meaning, and interpretative meaning. In a literal understanding, the researcher 
only looks to the face value meaning of a text and reconstructs the significance of the text 
from its literal meaning. In an interpretative understanding, the researcher looks to the 
context from which the document was produced and reconstructs the meaning of the 
document by making a link between the text and its context. In other words, an 
interpretative meaning of a document is a product of the researcher’s interpretation of the 
relation between the document and its contexts. Hence, one important point in using 
documentary sources is how to make inferences about the matters in a document through 
analyzing the contexts of document other than looking to the factual assertions in the 
document (Platt 1981). In this research, in addition to relying on the literal meaning of 
texts, I have interpreted the meaning of documents on women’s rights within two main 
discourses in which discussions about women’s issues have been produced. Discussions 
on women’s rights produced by traditional jurists have been interpreted within the 
traditionalist discourse and discussions on gender rights, and women’s issues produced by 
reformist and feminist scholars have been interpreted within reformist discourse.  
Moreover, occasionally, researchers combine two or more research methods in their 
studying of the same phenomenon in order to augment the validity and reliability of their 
research. This method is known as “method triangulation” (Grix 2001). For instance, they 
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may enhance documentary information with in-depth interviews by those who are familiar 
with the phenomenon under investigation. Interviews can help a researcher to attain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the under-studied documents and become knowledgeable 
about the conflicting interpretations of the same event presented by key informants (Hakim 
1987). While interviews with key informants of the Islamic feminist movement in Iran 
have not been conducted in this research, I have referred to interviews that have already 
been done with both reformists and traditional jurists regarding the status of women in 
Islam. These interviews have clarified the standpoint of both reformist and traditionalist 
discourses on women’s issues.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II: ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN IRAN 
 Feminist Movements in Iran: 
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 changed the political structure from a secular 
monarchy to an Islamic government and put clergies at the top of the political hierarchy. 
Although at the first years of shaping the new fledgling Islamic government in Iran both 
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religious and non-religious groups had their seats in Iran’s legislative body in a pluralistic 
political circumstance, clergies gradually took control of most positions in political 
structure and established a national Islamic constitution at the legislative council. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran considered Islamic jurisprudence as the main basis of civil and 
social codes and compelled Iranian people to obey a set of Islamic laws. Under the name 
of an Islamic ideology, the government put pressure on women, through restricting their 
freedom and depriving them of some parts of their citizen rights (Ahmadi 2006). Afsaneh 
Najmabadi called these years after the Islamic revolution in Iran for women, “yeas of 
hardship, years of growth” (Najmabadi 1995). Although women were in a suffering 
situation, they always attempted and struggled to regain their rights and oppose the 
dominance of clergies in the past thirty years of Islamic government longevity. During 
these years, Iranian women with different religious, social and cultural backgrounds, 
whether religious or non-religious, conservative or liberal, rich or poor, educated or 
illiterate, tried to get back the grounds they lost through the implementation of monolithic 
religious policies in Iran (Moghissi 1999: 11).  
Because of political pressure in Iran in the early years of the Islamic revolution, feminist 
activism was mostly restricted to the activities of women living abroad. Iranian secular 
women living outside the country tried to advocate for women’s rights inside Iran. In later 
decades, the decrease of political pressure in Iran led the feminist movement to be followed 
by secular women inside the country.  Both of these groups, secular activists in and outside 
of Iran, have tried not just to regain women’s political and social rights, but also to draw 
the attention of the international world to the situation of Iranian women. Although these 
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activities were slightly successful in publicizing Iranian women’s painful circumstances to 
the world, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom for women inside 
Iran as an Islamic country (Ahmadi 2006: 5-13). 
One important reason for the little success of secular activism in bringing freedom for 
Iranian women was the barriers put forth by the government and jurists, who were 
commanding over all state institutions, in front of the secular activists. The Islamic 
government of Iran labeled secular discourse as an anti-religious and Western discourse, 
and barricaded its development within the Iranian religious culture. Moreover, the religious 
culture and social context of Iranian society did not accept secular feminist discourse as an 
authentic means for restoring women’s rights.  
Also, secular feminism was not thoroughly successful in drawing Western feminists’ 
attention to the condition of women in Iran because of the new wave of Islamophobia, 
which was spread in the world after the Islamic revolution in Iran. This trend of 
Islamophobia reached its climax after September eleventh, which made Western feminists 
not pay enough attention to women’s struggles in Iran and other Islamic countries when 
constructing a new feminist discourse. Also, in recent decades, international concerns 
about the nuclear and missile program of Iran turned Iranian feminist activism to a marginal 
issue in international dialogues.  
Therefore, it seems that a powerful religious movement from within the country was 
needed to be accepted by the majority of the Iranian Muslim population, and to be able to 
built support for women’s rights. In this regard, Iranian Muslim women have struggled to 
start a feminist movement with the purpose of reconstructing the notion of gender within 
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the Islamic discourse. Muslim feminists have tried to oppose the monolithic powerful 
structure and the clergy’s traditional readership of Islam; they have challenged traditional 
interpretation of Islamic theological and legal sources to begin a new tendency in Islamic 
feminism (Afshar 1998). 
Not only did Iranian Muslim feminists challenge the traditional interpretation of Islamic 
legal sources, but also they demanded more freedom in their social, economic, and political 
life. This resulted from feminist endeavors; not only have women not disappeared from 
public life after the Islamic revolution of 1979, but they also have been able to attain 
considerable accomplishments in various fields of industrial and educational works, artistic 
creation, and sports activities (Najmabadi 1995). Feminist activism has considerably 
developed after the presidential election of 1997, concurrent with the beginning of the 
reformist movement in Iran. As a result of political freedom in Iran following President 
Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997, we can witness an increase in the social and 
political presence of modern women, and a call for equal civil rights from Iranian 
reformists and feminist activists. Muslim women published feminist journals like Zanan 
and Payam-e Hajar and discussed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from a 
feminist perspective. The development of feminist discussions in the intellectual 
atmosphere of Iran have stimulated theological schools in the Qom, the center of political 
and religious power of Shi’i clerics in Iran, to run research institutes for discussion on 
globalized, modern realities pertaining to women’s issues. Clerics also published a journal 
for women entitled Payam-e Zan to explain their position on gender rights and answer 
questions proposed by Muslim feminists. Consequently, Muslim feminists could acquire 
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the possibility of dialogue with clerics concerning Islamic jurisprudence and the issue of 
women’s rights in Islam. During last decade, some Muslim feminists have continued their 
activities in collaboration with research centers affiliated with the Qom seminaries 
(Houzeh-ye elmie-ye Qom) and some others published their papers on gender rights in 
various academic journals. Mohammad Taghi Karami (2014)4 believes that Islamic 
feminism has increasingly developed after 2005 in Iran. He argues that Islamic feminism 
had not been taken seriously as an influential discourse by Iranian feminist activists before 
2005. In fact, it was during the last decade that most feminist activists have paid more 
attention to Islamic feminism and developed their feminist ideas within an Islamic context.5  
Islamic Feminism in the Middle East: 
The Islamic feminist movement was not just restricted to Iran. We can see the development 
of feminist movements in other Islamic countries in the Middle East. Azza M. Karam 
(2011: 202) classifies feminist movements in the Middle East and Arab countries into three 
streams in a continuum: secular (understood as a non-religious discourse), religious 
(largely, but not entirely, expressed in Islamic terms), and the Islamist movement (which 
is defending of an Islamic political ideology). 
Azza M. Karam states that secular feminists generally try to represent a faith-based 
discourse. Some secular activists are not antagonistic toward the religion; in contrast, they 
4 He is a faculty member of Allameh Tabatabae’i university in Tehran, Iran. He collaborates with public 
and private research institutes working on women’s issues and gender rights. He has recently conducted 
research on the feminist movement in Iran, including the Islamic feminist movement.  
5 The viewpoint of Mohammad Taghi Karami on Islamic feminism in Iran was published on 9/17/2014, by 
“Mehr Khane: Paygahe khabari khanevade va zanan,” (The news station for family and women), Code: 
4321.  
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are devout persons in their personal life and introduce themselves as Muslims. On the other 
hand, there are secular activists who do not believe in religious movements and presume 
religion itself as the main cause of oppression against women. These secular activists 
usually do not like to collaborate with their religious sisters in feminist endeavors. They 
believe that becoming involved in religion can create division between their ranks. Their 
efforts had a considerable effect on recapturing women’s rights in some religious countries. 
However, barely, in the Middle East and Arab World, is there any admiration and 
verification from religious circles for those working outside of the circle, like secular 
activists (Ibid). 
On the other side of the feminist activism continuum, there are Islamic activists. Muslim 
feminists in the Middle East acknowledge that women are under oppression in Islamic 
countries. They see Islamic reality as an appropriate option, which can release both men 
and women from suffering and oppression. For them, the main reason for the current 
injustice against women in Islamic countries is society’s lack of subordination to Islam. 
Because Arab countries are not following God’s law, we can see many problems in social, 
cultural, and political structures of Islamic societies. Therefore, they believe that the only 
way for removing the cruelty and injustice against women in Islamic countries is obeying 
God’s law and being subordinate to Islamic rules. It is because God’s order can always 
guarantee justice and fairness toward both men and women (Ibid 203). 
There is another feminist movement in the Arab world, known as the religious feminist 
movement, which falls in the middle of the feminist continuum between secular and 
Islamic movements. Religious activists are distinguished from Islamist activists, as they do 
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not advocate for any kind of political ideologies and separate themselves from the 
fundamentalist interpretation of religion, which some Islamic activists may advocate by 
following the shariʼa. They support of a set of rules, which is a combination of international 
legal instructions and all faith traditions (Ibid). 
In a comparison with the classification of feminist activism in the Arab world introduced 
by Karam (2011), we can classify feminist activism in Iran into two types: Islamic and 
secular. Since more than 98 percent of the Iranian population is Muslim (Vahedi 2010: 20), 
other religions remain in the minority in Iranian society. After the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, followers of other religions became more deprived of their citizenship rights than 
Muslims; they always have tried to acquire their rights as Iranian citizens. Such endeavors 
were implemented by men more often than women. Therefore, the feminist movement was 
a very marginal issue among followers of religions other than Islam, such as Jews, 
Christian, and Zoroastrian Iranians (Mehrangiz Kar 1993: 16). 
We can witness the presence of two other sorts of feminist movements in Iran: secular and 
Islamic. As mentioned already, secular activists were slightly successful in drawing 
international attention to the situation of Iranian women. Moreover, like in the Arab world, 
in which there is almost no praise from religious circles for those who advocate for 
women’s rights outside of these circles (Karam 2011: 202), we can observe a similar trend 
toward secular activism among the Iranian Muslim population. Religious culture and the 
social context of Iranian society did not consider secular feminism as an authentic means 
for restoring Iranian women’s rights. In addition to having less popularity among the 
majority of the Iranian population, secular feminism has experienced much political 
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pressure imposed by the Islamic government. The Islamic Republic of Iran has constantly 
accused secular feminist discourse of being a Western discourse, which supports Western 
values in contrast with Iranian religious and cultural values. 
Meanwhile, Iranian Muslim women have developed a feminist discourse from within an 
Islamic context, under the name of Islamic feminism. This discourse has had the potential 
to be accepted by the majority of the Iranian Muslim population, as well as to be immune 
from the governmental labeling as Western and secular discourse.  
Islamic feminism in Iran has considerable differences from Islamic feminism in the Arab 
world. Muslim feminists in Arab countries have tried to refer to the Islamic texts as the 
only authentic sources for emancipating women from oppression. They believe that God’s 
law, which was articulated in the sacred texts, is just and fairly ubiquitous; and the main 
reason for any injustice that has been implemented against women in the Arab world is 
disobeying God’s law (Karam 2011: 202). In this regard, Muslim feminists in the Arab 
world have referred to a traditional and classical interpretation of religious texts to find an 
appropriate solution for their problems and restore their complete rights.  
On the other hand, Iranian Muslim feminists do not think that a traditional interpretation 
of Islamic sources can resolve the modern problems Muslim women are experiencing in 
their daily activities. They believe that religious texts, as well as sacred sources, require 
reinterpretation from a modern perspective to accommodate modern, globalized realities 
in Islamic countries. Accordingly, they have tried to go beyond a traditional interpretation 
of religious texts in order to develop a new feminist paradigm on women’s issues and 
reconstruct Islamic notions on gender from a modern perspective.  
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Islamic Feminism in Iran: 
Women are calling for equal rights and participating in political structures of the Muslim 
world. They look for social, political, and cultural changes to improve women’s situation 
in Islamic societies. Everywhere in Islamic countries, Muslim and secular activists, plus 
those who have political powers, always try to find suitable solutions for modern problems 
caused by the changed status of women in Muslim societies. Meanwhile, as women’s issues 
turned to an essential element of modern Islamic discourse, a new generation of feminists 
was generated in Islamic countries, who named themselves Muslim feminists. Moghissi 
states that feminist activism has encompassed many brands, including religious and non-
religious, conservative and liberal, heterosexual and homosexual, white and non-white, 
individualistic and community-oriented. Hence, it seems rather superfluous to name a new 
brand of feminism identified by others or that self-identified as Islamic feminism (Moghissi 
1999: 125). 
In general, Islamic feminism can be defined as “a feminist practice and discourse expressed 
within an Islamic paradigm” (Bardan 2002: 17). Islamic feminism is not a specific 
characteristic of the West or East. It is an endeavor by Muslim women all over the world 
in restoring their rights, whether they are in countries with a majority Muslim population 
or from old established minority societies (Ibid: 3). 
Maybe it is redundant to identify a new kind of feminist activism in Arab countries under 
the name of Islamic feminism. However, since the feminist movement, which has been 
developed by Muslim women in Iran, is considerably different from the feminist 
movements in other Islamic countries, we can categorize it as a new feminist movement 
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under the name of Islamic feminism. Iranian Muslim women have looked to the notion of 
gender in Islam in a radical way. They have tried to present a new interpretation of sacred 
texts and Islamic principals in order to combat gender-biased policies and to advocate for 
equal legal rights. This movement of reinterpreting Islamic principles and sacred texts from 
a feminist perspective is unprecedented in the Islamic world. In this regard, Ziba Mir-
Hosseini remarked, “After three decades of Islamic revolution in Iran, we are now 
observing a growth in feminist readings of the holy texts which is unique among all Muslim 
countries” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 12).  
Muslim feminists in Iran believe that some parts of religious and sacred texts, especially 
some verses in the Qurʼan, cannot be employed in the modern period; those parts of sacred 
texts are required to be reinterpreted from a modern perspective. Accordingly, they 
proposed a new feminist paradigm on women’s issues, and reconstructed Islamic notions 
on gender from a modern perspective. The result of these feminist endeavors was a lively 
discussion over women’s role in Islam and the development of a novel understanding of 
women’s social, political, and spiritual status in an Islamic society. According to Esposito, 
Islamic feminism in Iran developed a tendency to reconsider the notion of gender in Islam 
in a new and radical way. He pointed out that Iran is a good case study of not just rethinking 
and reinterpreting Islamic legal sources, but also of reinterpreting and personally 
investigating sacred texts (Esposito 1998: introduction).            
The principal methodology of Iranian Islamic feminism is the methodology of classical 
Islam. Like other Islamic thinkers, Iranian Muslim feminists try to find appropriate answers 
for their questions through interpreting religious and sacred texts, especially the Qurʼan 
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(tafsir), as well as conducting independent research in various religious sources (ijtihad). 
Moreover, Muslim feminists in Iran try to use methods and tools of other disciplines, such 
as sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, and linguistic studies, when interpreting 
religious texts. They also put more emphasis on their life experiences as women, which is 
different from that of men in their interpretation of religion. Muslim feminists, besides 
Western and secular feminists, confirmed that most classical and also post-classical 
interpretation of religious texts is only based on the male’s experiences and man-centered 
questions. In order to reach an egalitarian interpretation of religious texts, it is necessary to 
reconsider those interpretations from a female perspective (Bardan 2002: 3).  
Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran: 
One of the main factors that has helped Iranian Muslim women to develop their feminist 
ideas was the result of endeavors Iranian Muslim reformers made in reconsidering the 
traditional interpretation of sacred texts. The new perception of Islam, introduced by 
Abdolkarim Soroush and other Muslim scholars, has helped feminist women to present a 
new interpretation of gender issues in Islam. The new ideas of essentials and accidentals 
of history, expansion of the prophetic experience, and the historical and hermeneutic 
interpretation of sacred texts paved the way for feminist activists to call for the necessity 
of rethinking religious sources from a feminist perspective. Those women gathered in 
reformist circles at the Kiyan Institute6 in Tehran, and published feminist journals like 
Zanan, in which they discussed women’s rights and gender roles in Islam. They applied 
6 The Kian Institute was an intellectual and cultural institute in Tehran, the capital city of Iran, in 
which Iranian reformists gathered around Abdolkarinm Soroush to organize their reformist 
activities.  
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Soroush’s ideas, as well as other reformers’ opinions, to their feminist discourse and 
followed reformers’ new approaches in interpreting religious texts. Emphasizing reformist 
ideas has helped Iranian Muslim feminists to integrate their faith with their feminist 
tendencies and has made it possible for them to develop a feminist discourse within an 
Islamic framework (Mir-Hosseini, 1996: 217-37).  
Another factor that played an important role in expanding Iranian feminist discourse was 
the tendency of Iranian Muslim women to adopt postmodern ideas in their discussion of 
women’s rights. Iranian Muslim feminists used postmodern concepts and theories to 
reformulate Islamic notions and law from a feminist perspective. Although it is generally 
agreed that any Islamic movement shows a trend toward a mediaeval Islamic period, the 
Islamic feminist movement is a modern movement using modern and postmodern ideas in 
its discourse (Amir Arjomand, 2004: 9-22). The Islamic feminist movement is barely 
understood as a reaction to modernity; in contrast, it is a natural consequence of 
reorganizing Islamic societies from a modern perspective. Iranian feminists integrated 
postmodern ideas and employed postmodern noetic tools like optimism, pluralism, drive 
for self-knowledge and the principle of diversity in their discussion. They rejected the 
essential nature of women as an important postmodern principle and adapted to the axiom 
of multiple truths, multiple realities, and multiple roles. 
One of the most important features of postmodern feminism is analyzing language from a 
postmodern view as a complicated mechanism for institutional control. Postmodern 
feminism criticizes not only the structure of power in relations of domination, but also the 
ideological forces, which maintain these relations of domination (Butler and W. Scott 
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1992; Donaldson 1992). Western feminists, using the perceptual tools of postmodern 
feminism, have criticized the language of monotheistic religions as being gender biased in 
favor of men’s desires. They have claimed that theologians and jurists’ biased 
interpretation of God represented a masculinized picture of God, which makes women 
inferior to men and justifies institutional oppression against women (Ahmadi 2006). 
Iranian Muslim feminists employed a similar postmodern perspective in their criticism of 
the Arabic language as the language of Islamic sacred sources. They emphasized the 
function of language in creating and sustaining the relations of dominance and institutional 
control. They tried to expand the breadth of their interpretation of Islamic sources from a 
feminist perspective to a new linguistic construction of the Arabic language. This new 
construction of language enabled Iranian Islamic feminists to challenge the literal meaning 
and traditional interpretation of sacred texts. Employing postmodern critiques of language 
in their discussion, Iranian Muslim feminists could unveil the role of language in 
maintaining a gender-biased interpretation of sacred sources. 
Two main sources made Iranian Muslim women familiar with postmodern concepts and 
theories: reformist discourse and secular feminist discourse. Iranian reformers, as well as 
secular feminists, have greatly used postmodern concepts in their own discussions. Iranian 
Muslim feminists, through connection with reformers and secular feminists, became 
familiar with postmodern ideas and applied these ideas in their Islamic feminist discourse. 
Using postmodern concepts and theories, Iranian Muslim feminists could prepare a 
scientific foundation for their discussion on the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from 
a feminist perspective.  
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In addition to the reformist movement and postmodern ideas, the globalization of women’s 
strides for equality and justice paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to develop their 
own feminist discourse. The processes of globalization have changed the structures of 
international trade, transportation, migration, communication, and information transfer 
through new, electronic technologies. These processes have brought multilingual and 
multicultural individuals who pursue various fluid identities (Giddens 1994). Indeed, the 
processes of globalization have made individuals and communities all over the world more 
integrated during past decades. This integration has made women familiar with the 
characteristics of feminist movements in various societies, and has strengthened the global 
consciousness of feminist activism on gender roles and women’s rights. The processes of 
globalization have brought a great awareness for women of various political interpretations 
of women’s rights, and have helped women to rethink their own society’s policies and 
norms. According to Tohidi, “As people became aware of various political systems in the 
world through the processes of globalization, they are less interested in accepting their own 
traditional political systems and gender regimes. . . . Not only those who left their countries, 
but also those who live in their original home country are now more likely to evaluate their 
own lives by comparing their rights, responsibilities, and restrictions with other people in 
a global context.” (Tohidi 2002: 1) 
 In recent decades, we have been witnessing an increase of feminist activities all over the 
world. Feminist conferences held by the United Nations after 1975 and other similar 
meetings sponsored by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increased 
cooperation among feminist activists from various societies. In this regard, after the 1995 
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world conference on feminism, which was held in Beijing, a significant number of 
international feminist communities and women-oriented organizations and NGOs have 
developed their activities in Iran. These international feminist communities and 
organizations have put Iranian feminists in close connection with other feminist activists 
in Western and Muslim countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: MAIN DISCOURSES PERTAINING TO ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN 
IRAN 
Reformist Discourse: 
Radical attitudes toward a traditional understanding of religious texts regarding women’s 
issues, introduced by Iranian Muslim feminists, are based on the reformers’ ideas about the 
necessity of reinterpreting Islamic sacred texts from a modern perspective. In developing 
their feminist discourse, Iranian Muslim feminists followed the ideas of Iranian reformist 
thinkers as the pioneers of reinterpretation of the Qurʼan and other sacred sources. One of 
the most influential figures among Iranian reformists, whose ideas had considerable effects 
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on feminist scholars and activists, was Abdolkarin Soroush. Soroush was introduced by 
Robin Wright and some other American journalist as the Martin Luther of Islam for his 
novel, reformist ideas about Islamic knowledge (Wright, R. 2000: 139). 
Iranian reformists have gathered at the Kiyan Institute, as an intellectual and cultural 
institute in Tehran, around Abdolkarinm Soroush. They have published their reformist 
ideas about social, cultural, and political structures of Islamic societies, as well as their 
feminist discussions, in Kiyan magazine. Furthermore, feminist scholars gradually joined 
the circle of reformist intellectuals at the Kiyan institute. They employed reformist ideas, 
developed by Soroush and other reformers at the Kiyan Institute, in their feminist discourse 
and proposed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts regarding women’s issues from a 
feminist perspective. 
In fact, Zananʼs shariʼa discourse was not an abstract discourse, rather it was part of a new 
trend, which developed within a political and religious foundation by Iranian Muslim 
reformers. This novel trend, which can be best described as a post-fundamentalist 
discourse, was the newest debate in post-Khomeini in Iran. This debate did not challenge 
only the term “gender” in Shariʼa, but also defied the discourse of the Islamic Republic on 
the condition of the political and Islamic state (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 315-16).7 
Among various reformist ideas, Soroush’s theories had the most influence on shaping 
Iranian feminist discourse. While Soroush, alongside some other reformist intellectuals in 
Iran, has not subscribed to the gender equality discourse, his reformist ideas on the 
7 Mir-Hosseini assigned a chapter in her book: “Islam and Gender: The religious Debate in Contemporary 
Iran” (1999) to the activities of the Kiyan institute and Soroush’s discussions on gender and feminism. 
38 
 
                                                          
interpretation of sacred texts and Islamic knowledge have enabled Iranian religious women 
to attune their faith with their feminist ideas. Soroush developed his reformist ideas in 
various disciplines, including theology, philosophy, sociology, and history of religion, as 
well as in gender studies and feminism. Soroush, against most of other Iranian reformers, 
was able to organize his reformist ideas in the form of coherent theories. These coherent 
theories were greatly used by Iranian women in shaping the underlying philosophy of 
Islamic feminist discourse Iran. Indeed, Soroush’s reformist theories stimulated Iranian 
Muslim feminists to discuss of women’s rights in Islam and propose the necessity of 
reinterpretation of sacred text from a feminist perspective. In this regard, I refer to Mir-
Hosseini, who mentioned the influences of Soroush’s ideas on feminist discourse. 
“I did not have any bright idea about how Soroush stimulated feminist women in 
Zanan. After I read his book about the essential and accidental in religion, I found 
that I have to shift my focus. Actually, it was not just his idea about gender that 
inspired women in Zanan, but also it was his new approach to the interpretation of 
sacred texts and his new conceptualization of Islam that authorized women to 
discuss gender equality. By now, I can see how his new interpretation of sacred 
texts opened up a new space for radical reformism in gender subjects, among other 
issues.” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 238)  
Soroush’s new ideas on the theology of Islam, the hermeneutic interpretation of the 
prophet’s tradition, and the philosophy of Islamic law and shariʼa have influenced Iranian 
Muslim scholars, especially those working in Zanan. One of his most influential reformist 
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ideas that shaped Iranian Islamic feminism was his discussion about the meaning of 
“essential” and “accidental” in Islam.  
 Soroush argued that, on the one hand, there are essential parts (zati) in the Qurʼan, which 
are unchangeable and ever-lasting. These parts are the main foundations of Islam. Without 
them, Islam is no longer Islam. On the other hand, there are some parts in the Qurʼan that 
were shaped by the society and time in which the prophet was born and raised. He called 
those parts accidentals (arazi) (Soroush 1989: 4-19).  
Soroush described his criterion in separating essential parts from accidental parts in the 
Qurʼan: the history of Islam is contingent as all other histories. My criterion in separating 
essential from accidental is based on this knowledge about things that could have happened 
in other ways. For example, the principle of oneness and uniqueness of God (tawheed) is 
an essential part of the Qurʼan because it could not have happened otherwise and without 
it, Islam is not actually Islam. However, it was an accidental of history that Muhammad 
was born in Arabia and therefore the language of the Qurʼan became the Arabic language, 
which shaped the main conceptual framework of the Qurʼan (Soroush 1999: 21). 
Soroush argued that because the prophet was Arab, his usage of notion and words in 
transferring God’s word to the people was confined to Arabic culture and language. 
Therefore, if the prophet had been born in another place besides Arabia, such as Greece or 
Iran, his language and also his way of thinking would be different. In addition, if he had 
been born in a place other than Arabia, Qurʼanic rules on social subjects would be different 
and hence the Qurʼan would be a different book in some parts, in those which are 
accidentals. Therefore, the Qurʼan is a product of a certain place and certain time. To 
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support his argument, he referred to the verses of the Qurʼan to show how the issues of 
some parts of the Qurʼan would be completely different if the language of the Qurʼan was 
not Arabic or the prophet had lived somewhere besides Arabia (Soroush 1989, 4-19). In 
his opinion, all of the events that have taken place in the history of Islam, which could have 
happened in other ways, are accidentals. These parts must not be included in the domain 
of faith (Soroush 2009: 89).  
To have access to the core message of religion, a believer should engage in a cultural 
translation of past events that happened in the early years of Revelation, to the present time. 
A believer’s ijtihad should be the historical translation of linguistic, socio-cultural, 
political, and economic circumstances from past to present. This historical translation is 
necessary for each Muslim to distinguish accidental from essential parts of religion. 
In other words, Muslims should differentiate “historical Islam” from the “spirit of Islam”. 
Soroush mentioned fourteen items that can help us in reconstructing historical Islam; these 
fourteen items give a clue to distinguish the accidentals from essentials in sacred sources:  
“Religion does not have an Aristotelian essence or nature; it is the Prophet who has 
certain goals. These goals are religion’s essentials. In order to express and attain 
these intentions and to have them understood, the Prophet seeks the assistance of 
(1) a particular language, (2) particular concepts and (3) particular methods (fiqh 
and ethics). All of this occurs in a particular (4) time and (5) place (geographical 
and cultural) and for (6) a particular people with specific physical and mental 
capacities. 
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The purveyor of religion is faced with specific (7) reactions and (8) questions and, 
in response to them, gives (9) specific answers. The flow of religion over the course 
of time in turn gives rise to events, moving some people to (10) acquiesce and others 
to (11) repudiate. Believers and unbelievers fall into (12) particular relationships 
with each other and religion; they fight battles or create civilizations, (13) engage 
in comprehending and expanding religious ideas and experiences or (14) wrecking 
and undermining them” (Soroush 2009:90-1). 
Therefore, the historical events that happened in the early years of Revelation within a 
specific time and place, the prophet’s particular language, method, and concepts used for 
transferring religion’s essentials to other people, as well as religious ideas about social 
orders, are all additions to the essential parts of religion, and must be translated to the 
present. Soroush argued that those who ignore the historian and contextual background of 
the Qurʼan and other sacred texts in their interpretation turns soon to autocrats who believe 
that the shariʼa and Islamic laws are unchangeable (Soroush 2000: 220). Rather, Soroush 
believes that shariʼa is silent and its representatives give the voice to it; shariʼa does not 
provide invariable answers for all historical problems (Soroush 1995, 34). 
In another reformist idea, known as the “expansion of Prophetic experience,” Soroush 
provided examples from the Qurʼan to prove that the prophet’s living experience was 
humanistic like other Muslims’ living experiences. He concluded that the prophet was a 
human like others, so his experience was humanistic. This humanistic experience was 
expanded throughout history by other Muslims. In this regard, he provided examples of 
how the prophet’s disciples expanded his religious experience in the history and developed 
Islamic knowledge (Soroush 1999: 21). Soroush referred to the speaking of Jalal al-Din 
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Muhammad Balkhi, known as Rumi, one of the most famous Islamic Sufis in the thirteenth 
century, to show how the prophet’s experience has expanded during the history of Islam.  
According to Rumi, revelation (wahy) did not stop with the death of the prophet. It was not 
just the prophet who received revelation; rather, Sufis have also received various kinds of 
revelation from the God. While Rumi believes that Sufis have also received revelation, he 
does not consider them as prophets because they do not have specific responsibilities and 
duties that God only put on the shoulders of prophets. 
Soroush argued that Sufis have added to Islamic knowledge and practices. For instance, he 
said that Rumi added other forms of prayers like sa’ma8 to the traditional forms of worships 
in Islam. Soroush considered masnavi9 as a supplementary to the Qurʼan, and said that 
Rumi added the notion of love to the Islamic literature. Soroush argued that Rumi defined 
the relationship of humans and God in a new form of lover-beloved relationship. This kind 
of relationship between the God and His creatures was not defined in the Qurʼan. Rather, 
the Qurʼan defined the relationship of God and believers based on hope and fear: hope to 
God’s mercy and fear of God’s punishment. 10 
8 Sa’ma literally means “listening” and is considered as a Sufi ceremony performed as dhikr (remembrance 
of the names of God). Sa’ma is a kind of worship, which often includes playing instruments, singing, 
recitation of the names of God, dancing, recitation of poetry, wearing symbolic attires and other rituals.  
 
9 Masnavi, or masnavi-I ma’navi, is an extensive spiritual poem written by Rumi, mostly in Persian. It 
consists of six books, which are known as one of the most influential sources in Islamic Sufism and 
mysticism. In this document, Rumi explains how to reach to the goal of being in true love with God. He 
discovers various aspects of lover-beloved mysticism and its spiritual joy.  
 
10 Siamak Dehghanpour did this interview with Abdolkarim Soroush under the subject of “Mawlawi and the 
Persian Qurʼan”. This interview was broadcasted by Voice of America on 05/10/2014 
http://ir.voanews.com/media/all/horizon/latest.html?z=1566 
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Based on this explanation, Islamic knowledge is not just restricted to what was stated in 
the sacred texts.  The prophet’s disciples and other Muslims like Sufis have added to this 
knowledge during the history of Islam. In extracting Islamic laws, we should also take into 
account that other documents have been added to the Islamic primary sources. Hence, 
Islamic laws are not immutable, since they are not only based on what was stated in the 
Qurʼan and Sunna.  
We can witness similar reformist ideas about the interpretation of religious texts, which 
have been developed by other Iranian Muslim reformers at the Kiyan institute. For instance, 
Alireza Alavitabar expanded Soroush’s theory about the accidentals of history to a vast 
degree, which covered most parts of the Qurʼan; he said that not only Arabic language and 
culture, but also scientific happenings, historical events, and many stories in the Qurʼan 
and the prophet’s tradition, lay in the realm of accidentals and do not apply to this time 
(Alavitabar, A. 2003). Said Amir Arjomand stated that there was not just the entire body 
of sacred law as an accidental part of the Qurʼan; also, the culture that has been extended 
around it should be considered as an historically contingent figure of sacred texts (Amir 
Arjomand 2002: 719-21). Regarding the historical and contextual interpretation of sacred 
texts, Malekian argued that we should look to the Qurʼan and Sunna from an historical 
perspective. We should ask what the prophet wanted to do with the help of the Qurʼan and 
Sunna in the specific historical and social circumstances of the early years of Islam. We 
should be aware of the main reasons behind his behaviors (Malekian 2000).  
Indeed, reformist discourse, which has been developed by Islamic intellectuals in Iran, 
represents a modern behavior that intends to reconcile feminism, democracy, and other 
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modern elements with Islamic faith. Not only Muslim intellectuals, but also some eminent 
clerics have called for Islamic reformation (Tohidi 2006: 628). These clergies, as well as 
Iranian reformers, have demanded reformulating Islamic concepts from a modern 
perspective and substituting traditionalist jurisprudence (fiqh-e sunnati) with dynamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh-e pouya) (Ibid). For instance, Saeed-zadeh confirmed that we should 
think of modifying the current system of fiqh to prevent obvious oppressions against 
women. Islamic laws on the right for divorce, the right for custody, and polygamy should 
be reviewed (Saeed zadeh, 1997). Some of these clergies collaborated with reformers at 
the Kiyan Institute and were active in Kiyan magazine, as well as in feminist journals like 
Zanan and Payam-e Hajar.  
Reformist theories regarding the contextual and historical interpretation of sacred texts, the 
expansion of prophetic experience, and the essentials and accidentals of history, paved the 
way for Iranian Muslim feminists to demand a reformation in interpreting religious texts 
from a feminist perspective. Based on these theories, they have argued that those verses in 
the Qurʼan that reflect some experiences of Arabic culture and Mohammed’s personal life 
were just specific to an historical time in the early years of Islam and are not applicable to 
the modern time.   
In this regard, Muslim feminists, through independent personal investigation of sacred texts 
(ijtihad), have identified many Islamic laws in gender issues as accidentals in Islam, instead 
of their current interpretation of being fundamentals in the Iranian legal constitution. 
Muslim feminists have provided examples of Islamic laws as specific to the Arab culture 
and the prophet’s society. Such rules include the law allowing Muslim men to marry four 
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women, the conditions of temporary marriage in Islam, and those rules that give automatic 
rights of divorce to men (Ahmadi 2006). For instance, Kazemi declared that polygamy was 
prevalent in pre-Islamic Arab society. Islam was not able to resist this tradition and remove 
it completely. Hence, in order to support women’s rights, Islam put limitations on 
polygamy and changed its conditions. Indeed, polygamy was imposed on Islam by the Arab 
culture in the early years of Islam. Now, the social condition has changed.  We are now 
aware that polygamy produces many problems and disrupts family relationships. 
Therefore, polygamy is not permissible at this time (Kazemi 2002). 
While Iranian Muslim women made endeavors in demonstrating gender-biased aspects of 
Islamic laws, their voices have not considerably been heard by traditional jurists. Women 
are still excluded from interpreting religious and sacred sources. One of the main reasons 
for this exclusion is the dominance of patriarchal ideology over the thinking mode of 
traditional jurists that left little space for women to take part in discussions for extracting 
shariʼa ideals from sacred texts. Moreover, traditional jurists did not consider feminist 
women as experts in Islamic knowledge. Hence, they did not accept feminist women’s 
interpretation of Islamic sources as an authentic and reliable interpretation. However, 
traditional jurists could not challenge the new interpretation of Islamic sources on women’s 
issues that was introduced by male reformers. They did not mostly accuse reformers as less 
educated in Islamic knowledge, since most reformist intellectuals and clergies have already 
studied Islamic sciences in academics, as well as in traditional schools in Qom seminaries 
(Houzeh-ye elmie-ye Qom). Therefore, reformers were more successful than Iranian 
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Muslim women in presenting the modern interpretation of religious texts on women’s 
issues and gender rights.         
Traditionalist Discourse: 
The objective of Iranian Islamist feminism is the pursuit of equality and justice in Islamic 
law on gender issues (Lorestani 2003). Iranian Islamist feminists challenge traditional 
jurists by presenting new discourses underlying Islamic legal thought. These discourses 
can be divided into two types: neo-traditionalist and reformist. Indeed, we can distinguish 
three discourses underlying Islamic legal thought Iran. The first is the discourse of classical 
fiqh text, known as traditionalist discourse. Traditionalist discourse was developed by 
jurists on the basis of biological differences between men and women. This discourse 
reflects circumstances of the society in which traditional jurists had lived. In that society, 
inequality between men and women was seen as the natural order of things. Patriarchal 
structure in that society shaped the world-view of classical jurists in their understanding of 
sacred texts.  
Gender relations are based on women’s duties in traditionalist discourse. According to Mir-
Hosseini, in classical fiqh texts, women are seen as sexual beings, not as social beings; the 
only domain in which women’s rights are partly discussed is family law (Mir-Hosseini 
2003). 
The influence of the patriarchal structure on classical jurists can be best seen in their 
interpretation of the marriage contract, which defines women as subject to the male 
authority. In classical fiqh text, the logical structure underlying the marriage contract is 
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similar to the sale contract. The man pays a dower (Mahr) to the woman to have access to 
her sexual and reproductive faculties. Although classical fiqh resembles marriage to the 
sale just in the form not in the spirit, it is the logic of the sale contract that underlies the 
classical fiqh conception of women’s rights. That is, classical jurists define the main 
purpose of marriage as gratification of sexual needs and procreation (Abd Al Ati 1997); 
they see women’s sexuality as a commodity, as a subject of the marriage contract. While 
there are both moral and legal obligations incumbent on each spouse in the marriage, moral 
obligations are unenforceable and marginal to legal obligations, those injunctions based on 
the rules of sale. 
Fuqahaʼ11 claim that they derive the ideal model of gender relations, particularly in 
marriage, from sacred sources. The influence of the patriarchal structure on the thinking 
modes of classical jurists, as well as the exclusion of women from producing religious 
knowledge, are two main reasons for the classical interpretation of sacred texts. The 
patriarchal ideology, which was an inalienable part of jurists’ lives, left little space for 
women to take part in discussions for extracting shariʼa ideals from sacred texts. The 
women’s voice is more marginalized in the political life of Muslim society as long as we 
move further from the years of Revelation (for more review, see Ahmed, 1992, chapter 4: 
“The Transitional Age”). Under the influence of patriarchal ideology, jurists created a 
gender-biased philosophical foundation underlying their traditional interpretation of sacred 
texts and Islamic legal thought. 
11 Fuqahaʼ are Muslim jurists responsible for the development of fiqh, as an Islamic science with its own 
specific legal theories and methodology, over the course of centuries.  
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Indeed, the epistemological and philosophical foundation of classical legal thought, which 
defines women’s status as a fixed and unchangeable issue in fiqh law, is the main reason 
for unequal gender relations embedded in traditionalist discourse. Fiqh rulings on gender 
rights are based on a set of philosophical and metaphysical assumptions like “women are 
created of and for men,” or “God gave women greater sexual desire than men which should 
be controlled by men.” Using these assumptions, fugaha’ made women subjugated to men 
in marriage and other fiqh rulings regarding gender relations. Defining marriage in a form 
of sale contract provides a juristic basis for women’s subjugation to men. In this regard, 
fugaha’ granted more freedom to men and set more restrictions for women in marriage 
rules. For instance, the Islamic law of marriage permits men to enter more than one 
marriage (up to four) at a time, as well as to abolish the marriage contract at will without 
the wife’s consent.  
Classical jurists not only looked at marriage as a social or private contract (muʼamala), but 
also considered it as a ritual/spiritual act (ibadat). Indeed, they did not want to lower the 
status of women to a commodity; rather, they considered women as humans. In this regard, 
in addition to defining the legal form of marriage in the form of a social contract 
(muʼamala), they talked about marriage as an act of worship. It is considered in figh that 
those rulings that lie in the realms of ibadat, which regulate relations between God and 
humans, are immutable and constant, and those rulings which are in the domain of 
muʼamala, which regulate relations between humans, are changeable and subject to rational 
explanation. However, classical jurists treated marriage rules and other rulings pertinent to 
gender relations, even those in the domain of muʼamala, as immutable and limited to the 
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scope of rationalization. They did not define gender relations and women’s status as social 
and cultural terms; rather, as divinely ordained subjects based on revelation (wahy), which 
has permanent validity and is not subject to change in response to social and political 
forces. 
In fact, in the Qurʼan, women’s status is not treated as a divinely ordained issue, but as a 
changeable social practice (Mir-Hosseini 2003). However, Muslim jurists, rather than 
embodying shariʼa ideals in fiqh rules, created God’s law according to their ideal model of 
family and gender relations, as a permanent Divine Justice (Sachedina 1999a:29). The 
philosophical and metaphysical assumptions underlying fiqh laws cannot be supported by 
sacred texts; they are contrary to the voice of revelation (wahy) and Qurʼanic objectives of 
bringing justice and fairness for both genders (Wadud 1999, Mernissi 1991, Hassan 1987). 
Muslim scholars concluded that these assumptions are rooted in the patriarchal structure of 
pre-Islamic Arabia, which continued to the Islamic era (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1991).  
Neo-traditionalist Discourse: 
Another discourse underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran is the neo-traditionalist or 
modern discourse. Neo-traditionalist discourse was started in last decades of the nineteenth 
century and was more developed in the early years of twentieth century. This discourse is 
known as the modern discourse in Islamic legal codes. The encounter of modern nation-
states with waves of modernity changed gender roles and women’s status in Islamic 
countries. Neo-traditional jurists tried to find a solution for modern problems emerged in 
Islamic countries because of the changed status of women. Their aspiration for creating 
gender equality in Islamic law is not based on the Western discourse; rather, it is based on 
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the demand of Muslim women for freedom and justice in their everyday lives in the 
twentieth century.  
On the one hand, neo-traditionalists tried to resist the emergence of Western values and 
lifestyles, which was supported by secular elites in Islamic countries. On the other hand, 
they wanted to support gender equality and accommodation of traditional fiqh rules with 
the modern discourses on women’s status and gender roles. The result of their efforts was 
arguing for gender equality in some parts of Islamic laws and rejecting reformation in some 
others (for more review see, Mir-Hosseini 1999, Mutahhari 1991, Siddiqi 1952). 
In order to defend the fiqh notion of gender, as well as support equality in gender rights, 
neo-traditionalists changed the assumptions and theories underlying classical fiqh texts, 
and defended of the theory of “naturalness of shariʼa law.”12 For instance, they did not 
accept this classical assumption that “women were created of and for men.” Instead, they 
declared that both men and women were created equally and each can attain perfection 
independently; women are not dependent on men to attain perfection and salvation. 
However, men and women should have different roles in their lives since they have 
different rights and duties. In other words, while neo-traditionalist changed some gender-
biased assumptions underlying classical fiqh text, they defended the fiqh model of gender 
relations since they believed that this model is in line with human nature. 
12 The theory of naturalness of shariʼa law was first introduced by Allameh Tabatabaʼi, a famous shiʼa 
philosopher, in pre-revolutionary Iran, in his Qurʼanic commentary known as Al-mizan. This theory was 
developed by his student Murtaza Mutahhari as the philosophical foundation of shariʼa law. 
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They believed that both men and women are equal in the eyes of God, but this equality 
does not mean that both genders should have equal rights and duties. Since men and women 
have biological differences, they were assigned different rights and duties. This difference 
in rights and duties does not mean inequality or injustice; rather, it is the very essence of 
justice, which was reflected in fiqh rules.  
In this regard, jurists, in their defense of the fiqh notion of women’s rights, tried to reform 
traditional assumptions underlying classical fiqh rules. They proposed the notion of 
complementarity of gender rights and duties and the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa 
law. In their endeavor to modify the gender biased assumptions underlying traditional fiqh 
texts, neo-traditionalists looked to Western sources like sociological and psychological 
sources to prepare scientific evidence for their argument. However, their usage of scientific 
sources was selective and they just used those modern theories that were in line with the 
fiqh definition of gender relations.  
To better clarify the standpoint of neo-traditional jurists on women’s status and gender 
relations in Islam, I refer to the ideas of Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, one of the most 
famous Shi’a jurists in contemporary Iran. Mutahhari’s ideas, which were expressed in his 
book, The System of Women’s rights in Islam, have been followed by the majority of 
contemporary jurists in Iran as the reference of their discussion for women’s rights in Islam. 
Most neo-traditional jurists have accepted Mutahhari’s definition and explanation of 
human rights in general and women’s rights in particular in Islam. Hence, his interpretation 
of women’s rights can be used as the representative of the interpretation of women’s rights 
in neo-traditionalist discourse. 
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Not only do neo-traditionalists follow Mutahhari’s explanation of women’s rights, but also 
traditional jurists who are responsible for making Islamic law in contemporary Iran have 
admitted to following his opinions. Therefore, his opinions about the Islamic definition of 
gender roles and women’s rights have been accepted by both traditional and neo-traditional 
jurists. His argument is based on the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa law, which 
considers fiqh rules in line with human nature (fitra). Mutahhari does not accept the 
assumption that “women were created of and for men”; however, he believes that nature 
separately has granted a certain kind of characteristic to men and women, which cannot be 
exchanged. According to the separate dispositions granted by nature, men and women hold 
different rights and are responsible for different duties in their lives. In this regard, he 
considers women’s sexuality subordinate to men’s sexuality as a consequence of gender 
differences in emotional dispositions and moral issues:  
“Under the command of creation, every man and woman has a certain disposition 
and certain characteristics, when compared with each other, which cannot be 
exchanged and are not the same. . . . Nature has devised the ties of husband and 
wife in such a form that the part of woman is to respond to the love of man. The 
affection and love of a woman that is genuine and stable can only be that love which 
is born as a reaction to the affection and admiration of man towards her. So the 
attachment of the woman to the man is the result of the attachment of the man to 
the woman and depends upon it. Nature has given the key of love of both sides to 
the man, the husband. If he loves his wife and is faithful to her, the wife also loves 
him and remains faithful to him. It is admitted that women are naturally more 
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faithful than men, and that a woman’s unfaithfulness is a reaction to the 
unfaithfulness of the man.” (Mutahhari 1991: 297 and 274) 
Mutahhari did not change or modify the body of classical fiqh rules on marriage and gender 
relations; instead, he presented a new rationalization for classical Islamic laws. For 
instance, he stated that the right to divorce should remain in the hand of men because the 
law of Nature has granted this right to men: 
“Nature has deposited the key of the natural dissolution of marriage in the custody 
of man. In other words, it is a man who by his own apathy and unfaithfulness 
towards her wife makes her cold and unfaithful. Conversely, if the indifference 
begins on the side of the wife, it does not affect the affection of the man, rather, 
incidentally, it makes the affection more acute.” (Ibid: 297)  
If the fiqh rules on gender relations and women’s rights are based on the natural differences 
between both genders, then these rules remain everlasting, which cannot be changed in 
various social, cultural, and political circumstances. Natural differences are defined as 
biologic and inborn emotional differences, which are constant ubiquitously. Indeed, 
rationalization of Islamic laws according to the natural differences between men and 
women distances these laws from the influences of time and society. While neo-
traditionalists changed the gender-biased assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts, they 
did not make considerable changes in the form of classical fiqh rules. For instance, they 
accentuated emotional and moral aspects of marriage, and did not look to marriage as a 
model of sale contract the same as classical jurists. However, their conclusion of Islamic 
laws on marriage was the same as that of traditional jurists. In other words, what neo-
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traditional jurists did was provide a new justification for gender-biased Islamic laws on 
gender roles and women’s rights. 
Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist Discourse: 
While neo-traditional jurists, alongside traditionalists, changed the form of some parts of 
fiqh rules on gender issues, they have mostly remained faithful to the classical 
interpretation of fiqh texts. They have tried to prepare a new explanation and rationalization 
for definitions of fiqh on women’s rights. In this regard, they have followed of Mutahhari’s 
ideas in the rationalization of Islamic legal thought. Not only have neo-traditional jurists 
followed Mutahhari’s ideas on women’s rights in Islam, but also traditional jurists applied 
his theories in their arguments for gender roles and women’s rights in Islam. To better 
clarify the standpoint of traditionalist discourse on women’s rights, I refer to the ideas of 
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, as one of the most influential jurists in making Islamic law in 
Iran. Present traditional jurists usually refer to his theories in their discussions on women’s 
issues. Moreover, his opinions are in line with the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
on women’s rights and gender roles. It is true that the ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi 
are representative of traditionalist discourse in contemporary Iran. However, his ideas can 
also be discussed within neo-traditionalist discourse. He believes in neo-traditional 
assumptions underlying Islamic law, like the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa law, 
which was proposed by Ayatollah Mutahhari. Moreover, he believes that jurists should 
take into account the modern realities of Muslim society, as well as the results of modern 
science, in making Islamic law. 
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Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi classifies various theories on gender differences into three 
groups and describes Islamic worldview on gender differences: 
“There are three distinct theories about the differences between men and women. 
The first theory doesn’t consider any difference between men and women. 
According to this theory, we shall accept that all men and women are equal in all 
aspects of their lives. However, this theory isn’t compatible with scientific rules 
and the reality of life. Those, specifically Westerns, who support this theory in their 
argument on gender differences, disregard equality between both genders in their 
practical lives.  
The second theory considers the status of men higher than women’s. This theory 
believes in gender differences and considers men as the first gender and women as 
the second gender. Men’s rights are accepted and women’s rights are denied in this 
theory.  
Both of these theories are incorrect since they don’t rely on the real differences 
between men and women. The correct perspective on gender differences, which is 
the Islamic perspective, says that men and women have different responsibilities in 
their lives according to their different physical and mental characteristics. To better 
understand the differences between men and women’s responsibilities, the status of 
men and women in the society can be assimilated to the status of mind and heart in 
the body. We cannot say that heart has higher status than mind in the body. Each 
of those parts has separate vital responsibilities in the body. In fact, without each 
of these parts, the body fails to survive. 
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Therefore, by paying attention to the real differences between men and women, 
Islamic laws on gender issues are easy to follow and understand.” (Tahura journal: 
2008)13 
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi assimilates society to the human body, and the role of men and 
women in a society to the role of heart and mind in a body. Mind and heart have separate 
responsibilities in a body and the whole function of a body depends on the function of 
them, respectively. While the proper function of these two parts is essential for the proper 
function of the body, neither of them can replace the other’s responsibilities.  
To better clarify his ideas about the naturalness of differences in gender roles, Ayatollah 
Makarem Shirazi provides examples of social roles, which are done by men and women, 
respectively: 
“There are many works in a society that are classified as harsh works. We believe 
that since women are more sensitive than men, these harsh works are not 
compatible with their emotional characteristics. Therefore, these works are 
appropriate for men. For instance, commanding a brigade is a harsh work, which is 
suitable for men, not women, as well as being the pirate of a warplane. A pirate 
needs to know skydiving and other hard skills. In every place in the world, these 
works are done by men.” (Ibid)  
In the same way, he provides an example of fiqh rules on differences in gender roles: 
13 Pajuheshgah olum ensani va motaleate farhangi, (Human science and cultural studies institute) arranged 
this interview with Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, and published his opinions on women’s rights in Tahura 
journal, portal jame olum ensani, on 87/1/12, 03/31/2008.  
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“Judgment is also considered as a harsh and rough job, where a judge sometimes 
sentences the death penalty for a culprit, whipping for a condemned person, or 
taking away all of a theft’s belongings. It is stated in Islam that a woman’s 
sensitiveness and soft-heartedness is not in line with harsh judgment environment. 
However, women can receive many other roles in the society that have higher status 
than judgment and are more suitable for them.” (Ibid)  
Therefore, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi distinguishes different roles for men and women 
according to their different physical and emotional characteristics. Moreover, he confirms 
that there always are exceptions among men and women in physical and metaphysical 
characteristics. For instance, he states that maybe there is a woman who is less sensitive 
than men and is able to do the harsh works. However, a ruler does not have to pay attention 
to the exceptions in making a law. A ruler always considers characteristics of the majority 
of population in creating laws; he cannot make a rule according to the characteristics of the 
minority or the exceptions. Therefore, a ruler always makes a law according to the 
characteristics of the majority of the population. In all places in the world, rulers disregard 
characteristics of the exceptions in creating laws. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi explains that 
this methodology used in making law is based on the principle of hikmah14. According to 
the principle of hikmah, a ruler always tries to make a law compatible with the 
characteristics of the majority of population. This law must be obeyed by the whole of 
14 The literal meaning of hikmah is wisdom in Arabic. Hikmah, or wisdom, is the application of the right 
knowledge at the right time to a specific issue. Hikmah is to know as the best of things by way of the best 
of sciences. This term can be associated with all matters of human life. In other words, there is not any 
limitation to the application of hikmah in every aspect of our lives. 
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population, even by the exceptions that their characteristics are not similar to the 
characteristics of the majority. The principle of hikmah also applies in making Islamic law. 
For instance, he provides examples of Islamic laws on women’s rights, in which the jurists 
pay attention to the characteristics of the majority of the population and disregard specific 
characteristics of minorities: 
“In Islam, the heritage for men is twice women’s heritage. It is because in Islamic 
worldview, men are responsible for the whole expenses of the family; they have to 
cover the expenses of home, clothing, the wife’s dower, medicine, etc. A man has 
to satisfy the whole of his wife’s and his children’s needs. He is the only one 
responsible for meeting the family costs.15 
Therefore, since a man has more economic responsibility than a woman in the 
family, his heritage is twice that of a woman. Some people say that there are 
families in which women are responsible for the expenses of the family. In some 
families, men are unemployed and women are the breadwinner and economic 
supporter of the family. Therefore, in such families, women’s heritage must be the 
same as or twice men’s heritage. We (jurists) reply to these people that if we want 
to consider these exceptions in making laws, there will always be challenges in the 
law of heritage. A ruler cannot easily distinguish whether a woman has more or less 
responsibility in her family. A ruler cannot make a rule for these exceptions. Hence, 
15 This interpretation of Islamic worldview regarding the assignment of economic responsibilities in the 
family had also been articulated by Murtaza Mutahhari (for instance, see “the system of women’s rights in 
Islam”: 78). 
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according to the principle of hikmah, we should look to the characteristics of the 
majority of population. In most cases, men are the breadwinner and are responsible 
for the expenses of family. Therefore, their heritage was determined to be twice 
women’s.” (Ibid) 
He also provides another example of Islamic laws on men’s and women’s rights to show 
the naturalness of shariʼa law: 
“According to the principle of hikmah in Islamic law, men’s diyeh16 is twice that 
of women’s. The reason for this difference is that the death of husband in a family 
will cause more economic pressure for that family than the death of wife. Since a 
man is responsible for the expenses of his family, his death will bring more 
economic pressure for his family than the death of his wife. Some people say that 
the difference in the amount of diyeh shows that there is a difference in Islam 
between the price of men’s and women’s blood. This explanation is not true, since 
killing a man or a woman has the same punishment in the God’s eyes. Difference 
in men’s and women’s diyeh is related to the economic issues. Again, since a ruler 
looks to the characteristics of the majority, he considers men, not women, as the 
main supporters of the expenses of families. Therefore, men’s diyeh should be twice 
that of women’s.” (Ibid)  
16 Diyeh is an Arabic term, which means ransom or blood money. According to Islamic law, diyeh is the 
financial recompense is given to the victim or the heirs of a victim in the cases of murder, the loss of body 
parts, or the damage of property. This punishment is an alternative to the punishment of Qisas (equal 
retaliation) in Islamic jurisprudence.      
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As we can see, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi tries to rationalize the differences in Islamic 
laws on gender issues. He confirms that this difference in Islamic laws on gender issues is 
based on the natural differences between men and women. Men and women play different 
roles in a society and, according to their natural and inborn characteristics, they have 
different duties and responsibilities in their family and society. Therefore, Islamic laws 
must be based on these differences and hence, must be different for men and women. While 
he confirms that Islamic laws for men and women are different, he does not believe that 
these laws are always constant and everlasting. He states that there are two kinds of Islamic 
laws: constant laws and variable laws. Indeed, according to specific kinds of principles, an 
Islamic law can change during history. He declares that an Islamic law can be modified if 
one of these three conditions happens: 
1- The change in the subject of an Islamic law: according to a general Islamic 
principle, we can buy or sell everything that has a considerable Halal17 benefit. 
Perhaps buying and selling one thing in the past time was not permissible according 
to Islamic laws since that thing did not have any considerable benefit.  However, 
buying and selling of that thing is permissible right now since now it has a 
considerable Halal benefit. For instance, human’s blood did not have Halal benefit 
in the past. Now, however, it has a Halal benefit. Blood transfusion can save a 
person’s live. Therefore, buying and selling a human’s blood is now permissible 
according to Islamic laws. Also, animals’ blood is now used for the nutrition of 
17 Halal is every object or action that is allowed to use or engage according to Islamic law. Haram is every 
object or action that is forbidden to use or engage according to Islamic law. The terms Halal and Haram 
cover all items of daily life. 
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some other animals. Therefore, buying and selling animals’ blood is also 
permissible since it has Halal benefits. One other example in this regard is the 
buying and selling of humans’ organs to the sick people who need those organs to 
live. In these cases, we can see the change in Islamic laws as the subject of that law 
that has changed. 
2- A new scientific discovery: In this condition, the subject of an Islamic law has not 
changed. Instead, the results of a new scientific discovery have caused the change 
in an Islamic law. For instance, it was thought in the past that using tobacco did not 
have detriments for the health. Therefore, most of Ulama used to smoke cigarettes 
or the hookah. However, now, according to the latest medical discoveries, it has 
been proven that using tobacco can cause dangerous illnesses. Therefore, the result 
of this medical discovery has caused a change in Islamic law on using tobacco. 
Indeed, since jurists did not know that using tobacco had several detriments for 
humans’ health, they permitted using tobacco. Now, though, using tobacco is not 
permissible according to Islamic law, since its detriment for health has been proven 
by recent medical research.  
3- The coincidence of a second title on the subject of an Islamic law: Sometimes, with 
the passage of time, a second title is attached to an Islamic law, which causes the 
change of that law. For instance, in Islam, the right of divorce was completely in 
the hands of men. In recent times, divorce conditions have changed and women can 
also repudiate their marriage under specific conditions. In present times, if men 
have the right to divorce without the supervision of court, women will be deprived 
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of their rights because men are free to repudiate marriage without any logical 
reason. 
In the past, the divorce rate was very low and men did not repudiate marriage 
without logical reasons, but in recent years, they have misused their right for 
divorce. Therefore, the change of conditions caused a change in Islamic law of 
divorce. In other words, a second title has been attached to the Islamic law of 
divorce. 
In recent years, women can repudiate marriage through two options: first, they can 
include their desired demands in the marriage contract, which must be satisfied by 
their husband. If their husband does not pay attention to those demands, the woman 
can repudiate marriage. Second: a woman can argue to an Islamic court that she is 
in the status of usar wa haraj18. When an Islamic court finds that a woman is really 
in usar wa haraj, it will command the husband to satisfy his wife’s needs. If again 
the husband does not pay attention to the court’s commands, Islamic court will 
repudiate their marriage according to the women’s request without her husband’s 
consent (Ibid). 
According to Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, if each of the above conditions happens, an 
Islamic law on women’s issues will change. Again, he confirms that a change in an 
Islamic law can only happen if the characteristics of the subject of an Islamic law have 
changed. On the other hand, if the subject of a law has not changed, the law will remain 
unchanged. This is because what the prophet declared Halal will remain Halal and 
18 Usar wa haraj is a concept in Islamic fiqh, which means the continuation of marriage will cause the 
woman harm and hardship. 
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what he declared Haram will remain Haram until the doomsday. He claims that if we 
act according to this methodology, many problems on women’s issues will be solved. 
However, he cautions that we should not join the international women’s convention 
because joining this convention is not useful for women. We should act according to 
traditional fiqh texts, which regulate every aspect of our lives (Ibid). 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION  
Discussion and Conclusion: 
Since one of the main purposes of the Islamic revolution in Iran was to return to the ideals 
of shariʼa, after the Islamic revolution, the Iranian Islamic state translated the fiqh notion 
of gender into the state policy. In the early years of the Islamic state, jurists responsible for 
legislating civil laws followed traditional readership of fiqh texts and created the Islamic 
constitution on the basis of the classical fiqh definition of gender. Because of the support 
of the majority of the Iranian population of the Islamic revolution and its ideals, traditional 
jurists were not required to provide any explanation or rationalization for the Islamic laws 
on women’s issues in the early years of revolution. 
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After one decade of the establishment of the Islamic state, Iranian feminist and reformist 
activists questioned gender-biased aspects of Islamic laws. Decrease of political pressure 
inside Iran after the presidential election in 1997 provided this opportunity for reformist 
and feminist activists to develop a new discourse on gender based on modern and Western 
values. With the emergence of reformist discourse and the expansion of reformist and 
feminist activism, a new generation of Iranian jurists, known as neo-traditional or modern 
jurists, tried to provide a rational explanation for their traditional readership of classical 
fiqh texts. 
Different factors caused the development of Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. The 
processes of globalization, which made Iranian Muslim feminists connected to Western 
and non-Muslim feminist activists, the activities of secular feminists, and the expansion of 
modern and postmodern ideas on gender roles and human rights in the intellectual 
atmosphere of Iran were all influential on the development of Iranian Islamic feminism. 
Among all of these factors, it was the reformist movement that had the most influence on 
the development of Iranian feminism. Indeed, the new approach in the interpretation of 
Islamic laws and sacred texts expanded in the reformist discourse was greatly used by 
Iranian Muslim feminists in the development their Islamic feminist discourse. 
Iranian Muslim feminists’ activism, as well as reformists’ endeavors in challenging 
philosophical foundations of fiqh rulings made not only neo-traditional but also traditional 
jurists reconsider Islamic laws on gender issues. Another factor that pushed jurists to 
rethink fiqh rules on gender issues was the influence of Western values and modern 
lifestyles on the Iranian family structure. The entrance of Western values has changed the 
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lifestyles of Iranian people and the structure of the Iranian family. Increased presence of 
women in higher education and workplaces, increased rate of divorce and single-parent 
families, the prevalence of pre-marital sexual relationships, increased presence of women 
in the political structure, and the development of women’s social activism are all among 
the realities of Iranian women’s lives in recent decades. These factors stimulated traditional 
and neo-traditional jurists to accommodate classical fiqh texts with the modern realities of 
Iranian society. 
In this regard, they have changed gender-biased assumptions underlying classical fiqh 
texts, as well as those parts of Islamic law which are not in line with women’s rights. While 
neo-traditional jurists, alongside traditionalists, changed the form of some parts of fiqh 
rules on gender issues, they have mostly remained faithful to the classical interpretation of 
fiqh texts. Indeed, they have tried to prepare a new explanation and rationalization for the 
definitions of fiqh on women’s rights.   
According to the neo-traditionalist viewpoint, Islamic laws must be different for men and 
women, and only with this difference will justice toward both genders be served. The 
philosophy of Islamic laws is based on the theory of complementarity of gender rights and 
duties. Men and women have different responsibilities and duties in a society, and hence, 
different rules must regulate their lives. Neo-traditionalists believe that Islam is a religion 
of fairness, which brings justice for everyone. This justice is only guaranteed if there are 
gender differences in Islamic law. In other words, they believe that Islamic law is fair 
toward both genders, but this fairness does not mean proportional equality. To rationalize 
their understanding of gender differences in Islamic law, they provide various explanations. 
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On the one hand, they advocate for the theory of naturalness of shariʼa law, which states 
that fiqh rules are in line with human nature (fitra). They say that from a biological 
perspective, women and men have some natural and inborn differences that demand 
different considerations regarding their rights and duties. 
For instance, Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari says that in Islam, the right for divorce is in 
the custody of men because nature has granted this right to men. He believes that naturally, 
if unfaithfulness begins on the side of a man, it makes his wife cold and unfaithful. Rather, 
if the indifference begins on the side of a woman, it makes her husband’s affection more 
acute. Hence, this is a man who can make his wife cold and indifferent through showing 
apathy toward her, and therefore can dissolute the marriage. If a woman shows this 
indifference toward her husband, the result would be reversed since the woman’s 
indifference will increase the man’s affection and will strengthen the romantic relationship. 
He continues that it is admitted that naturally, women are more faithful than men and their 
unfaithfulness is a reaction to men’s unfaithfulness (Mutahhari, 1991: 297 and 274). This 
explanation is based on the theory of naturalness of shariʼa law. 
On the other hand, neo-traditionalists provide scientific explanations for their gender-
biased readership of fiqh texts. They claim that Islamic laws on gender issues are also 
compatible with scientific theories. In this regard, Ayatollah Murtaza mutahhari provides 
examples from Western sources in sociology and psychology to rationalize assumptions 
underlying classical fiqh texts. He does not accept previous gender-biased assumptions 
underlying classical fiqh texts introduced by traditional jurists, like the assumption that 
“women are created of and for men.” Instead, he provides other assumptions, which are 
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based on natural and biological differences between men and women. He believes that 
these assumptions are also supported by scientific results. However, his usage of scientific 
theories, in supporting assumptions underlying fiqh rules, is selective. He uses those parts 
of scientific theories that are parallel with the fiqh definition of gender and avoids using 
those parts of modern science that contradict with the definition of gender relations in 
classical fiqh texts in his argument. 
He says that Islam has done a great service to women. It has recognized women’s natural 
rights and has given them independence, freedom, and personality. However, there are 
differences between the steps taken by Islam and the West toward women’s issues. One of 
these differences is about the psychology of men and women. He believes that Islam has 
done and revealed a great wonder in the field of psychology of men and women, which is 
different in some angles from that of Western psychology (Mutahhari 1999: 13). 
Indeed, his usage of psychological sciences is selective; to support his argument on 
women’s rights, he refers to those parts of modern sciences that are consistent with the 
psychology of men and women presented by Islam. He refers to the ideas of those Western 
scientists who believed in natural differences between males and females. For instance, he 
mentions the ideas of Alexis Carrel, a French psychologist and biologist, who believed that 
according to the law of creation, men and women have been created differently, and 
because of these natural differences, they must have different rights and obligations (Ibid: 
53). Carrel believed that differences between men and women are not just related to 
differences in the shape of their genital organs, or the female’s capacity to give birth to 
children. It emerges from the differences in chemicals, which genital glands secrete into 
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the blood. Organic and psychological differences between men and women require them 
to advance in two dissimilar directions. We should not visualize for women the same kind 
of aspirations and ideals, the same kind of life, and the same way of thinking as we visualize 
for men (Ibid).  
Mutahhari provides a similar explanation of the biological differences between males and 
females to that of another psychologist, professor Reek. He says that professor Reek, who 
has done extensive research about the affairs of men and women, also confirms that men 
and women have two different bodies, which are not similar in composition. They do not 
act or feel similarly, nor do they have similar reactions to various incidents. Indeed, they 
belong to two different worlds (Ibid: 57).  
Mutahhari states that in the modern world, the more medical, social, and psychological 
studies are done, the bigger disparities between men and women are discovered. According 
to the results of modern science, it is now obvious that the world of men is different from 
that of women in many respects (Ibid: 56). 
This trend of using scientific theories to rationalize gender-biased aspects of Islamic laws 
has been followed by contemporary traditional jurists. In addition, it seems that present 
traditional jurists even put more weight on the role of recent discoveries of modern sciences 
in their analysis of fiqh texts. Not only do they try to find a scientific basis for classical fiqh 
rules, but they also consider a possibility of changing in those parts of Islamic laws that are 
not supported by scientific results.  
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Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi says that an Islamic law can be modified if it is not supported 
by science. He provides an example of using tobacco, which was permissible in the past 
time since it was thought that using tobacco did not have any detriment to the health. 
However, using tobacco is not permissible right now according to Islamic law, since it has 
been proven by the science that it is harmful for the health. It seems that Ayatollah 
Makarem Shirazi relies on the findings of medical sciences. However, his opinion about 
the findings of human sciences is not as clear as his opinion about the findings of medical 
sciences. 
While the important parts of the assumptions underlying fiqh rules, like the assumptions of 
women’s sexuality, are mostly discussed in human sciences, it is not clear to what extent 
traditional jurists rely on the findings of human sciences on these issues. For instance, both 
Shiʼa and Sunni jurists believe that God gave women greater sexual desire than men. 
Hence, women’s sexual desire must be controlled by men (Mir-Hosseini 2003). If it is 
proven by the results of psychological and sociological research that women’s sexual desire 
is not greater than men’s, then men will not be responsible for controlling women’s 
sexuality and women are not to be subjugated to men. However, it is not obvious whether 
traditional jurists accept such findings of human sciences in the field of gender relations 
and women’s sexuality as authentic scientific rules. We cannot say whether they change 
their assumptions underlying fiqh rules according to the results of modern science. 
On the other hand, traditionalists, like neo-traditional jurists, mostly assign differences in 
male and female sexuality to the natural and inborn differences between both genders, 
which were designed by God. To support their argument, they only use those parts of 
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scientific theories that are in line with their definition of human sexuality and gender roles. 
Indeed, their usage of the theories of human sciences is selective, the same as the neo-
traditionalists’ method in reference to human sciences. They advocate for the theory of 
naturalness of shariʼa law. According to this theory, differences in male and female 
sexuality, as well as differences in gender roles, remain constant and unchangeable during 
time. 
Therefore, it is hard to say that traditionalists will rely on the findings of human sciences 
on gender issues and women’s rights in the same way that they have relied on the findings 
of medical science. Indeed, there is a pessimistic perspective among traditional and neo-
traditional jurists toward human sciences, as they believe that these sciences are not in line 
with people’s religious beliefs. It seems that with the existence of this pessimistic attitude 
toward Western human sciences among governmental figures, as well as traditional and 
neo-traditional jurists, especially in the recent years, it is unlikely that the findings of 
Western human sciences will have considerable effects on traditionalist discourse 
underlying Islamic laws.  
In addition to considering the possibility of change in Islamic law according to the findings 
of modern science, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi considers another possibility of change in 
Islamic law according to the change in social conditions of the society. He says that an 
Islamic law can be changed when a second title coincides on its subject. His example in 
this regard is the right for divorce, which was completely in the custody of men. However, 
in recent times, divorce conditions have changed and women can also repudiate their 
marriage under a specific set of conditions. He says that because in recent times, men have 
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repudiated the marriage contract without any logical reason, Islamic law of divorce has 
changed to limit men’s freedom in repudiating the marriage contract and to restore 
women’s rights. Therefore, the change in the contemporary social conditions has caused 
the change in the Islamic law of divorce. 
While he supports the change in the Islamic law for divorce, he does not believe in the 
necessity of modifying the Islamic laws of heritage and diyeh. He provides a rationalization 
for gender differences in the Islamic laws of heritage and diyeh. He explains that a man is 
responsible for all of the expenses of his family; a man has to satisfy all of his wife’s and 
children’s needs. Therefore, since a man has more economic responsibility than a woman 
in a family, his heritage must be twice that of a woman. In the same way, he explains that 
since a man is responsible for the expenses of the family, his death will cause more 
economic pressure on his family than the death of his wife. Therefore, men’s diyeh must 
also be twice that of women’s. He continues that there are families in which men are 
unemployed and women are responsible for the expenses of the family. However, these 
families are in the minority and jurists cannot pay attention to the characteristics of 
minorities in making laws.  
According to this explanation, the question is that if a considerable change happens in 
social conditions in which women will have more economic responsibilities than men in 
their families, will the Islamic laws on heritage and diyeh be modified? Traditional jurists’ 
answer to this question is obscure. On the one hand, they say that jurists look to the 
characteristics of the majority of the population in making laws. Hence, we expect that if 
in most families women have more economic responsibility than men, then their heritage 
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will be twice or at least the same as men’s. On the other hand, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi 
says that in Islam, men are responsible for the expenses of their family. He believes that 
according to Islamic teachings, a man has to satisfy all of his wife’s and his children’s 
needs. With this explanation, we expect that the change in social and economic conditions 
of a society does not provide any change in men’s responsibilities in supporting the 
economic needs of their families. Hence, the Islamic law of men’s heritage will remain 
unchangeable under different social and economic conditions.  
Therefore, it seems that traditionalists’ attention to the results of modern science and their 
attention to the change of social conditions in modifying Islamic law are selective. While 
they believe that the change in social conditions and the results of modern science are both 
influential in modifying Islamic laws, they do not apply this rule to all parts of fiqh rules. 
Traditionalists did not clearly specify which differences between men and women are 
inborn and natural and which differences are the products of specific social conditions. 
Meanwhile, they have provided a rationalization for gender differences in the majority of 
fiqh rules according to the theory of “naturalness of shariʼa law,” and have modified only 
a few parts of fiqh rules according to the changes in social conditions or the results of 
modern sciences. It is because they believe that most parts of classical fiqh rules are 
everlasting; only a few parts of these rules require modifications in order to be employed 
in modern times. Therefore, while they have tried to change traditional gender-biased 
assumptions underlying Islamic laws, they have not changed most parts of these laws 
regarding gender issues. 
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Moreover, traditionalist discourse confirms that classical fiqh texts can regulate every 
aspect of our lives. We can find a solution for every problem and an appropriate answer 
for all questions we have in our lives in fiqh texts. Therefore, traditional jurists define 
gender relations, women’s rights, and all aspects of women’s sexuality within an Islamic 
context. This philosophy of interpreting Islamic sources is different from the reformists’ 
philosophy. 
Indeed, both reformist and traditional thinkers believe that Islam is a religion of fairness 
and justice. They both see in the shariʼa equality for both genders, however they reach 
different conclusions in applying Islamic laws from the shariʼa. Reformists and 
traditionalists believe in women’s rights, but they define them in two different ways. While 
neo-traditional and traditional jurists believe that gender differences in Islamic law bring 
justice for both males and females, reformists believe that justice and fairness toward both 
genders can only be acquired through proportional equality. 
These differences between reformists’ and traditionalists’ standpoint on women’s issues 
are based on their different philosophy in interpreting Islamic sources. Reformists, in 
contrast to traditional and neo-traditional jurists, consider a distinction between religion 
and religious knowledge. They believe that the objective part of religion, which is the 
revealed text, is different from religious knowledge, or the interpretation of that revealed 
text. While the objective side of religion (the revealed text) is sacred, holy, and immutable, 
religious knowledge is always subject to evolution. In this regard, reformists believe that 
all aspects of our understanding and interpretation of sacred texts, including fiqh rules, rest 
in the domain of religious knowledge and are subject to modification. On the other side, 
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traditionalists consider their own understanding of sacred texts, which is represented in fiqh 
rules, as holy and fixed as the sacred texts themselves. Indeed, by differentiating between 
these two concepts (religion and religious knowledge), reformists’ and traditionalists’ 
standpoints on shariʼa ideals and fiqh rules can better be understood. 
Traditionalists believe that Islam has regulations for every aspect of our lives, and we can 
find an appropriate answer for all of our questions in Islamic sources. Therefore, to define 
women’s sexuality and gender relations, they refer to the definition of classical fiqh texts 
on these issues. They think that women’s sexuality and gender relations were ordained 
Divinely, and hence are sacred and unchangeable. Rather, reformists see women’s 
sexuality as regulated by social circumstances and not by Divine will. Reformists claim 
gender inequality embedded in Islamic laws as a societal construction by male jurists that 
is neither sacred nor fixed, and rather is human and subject to contestation. 
Not only do traditional and neo-traditional jurists define gender roles and women’s issues 
within as Islamic context, but they also believe that Islam has a clear opinion about all other 
aspects of human life. In contrast to this readership of Islamic sources in traditionalist 
discourse, reformist discourse considers other responsibilities for religion. Reformists 
believe that religions and Islam in particular do not have any responsibility to regulate all 
aspects of human lives. They state that all parts of sacred texts should not be used as 
unchangeable sources in making Islamic laws, since those parts are just compatible with 
the social conditions of the early years of Islam. 
In this regard, Abdolkarim Soroush distinguishes between the essential parts and accidental 
parts of the sacred texts. He argues that there are essential parts (zati) in the Qurʼan, which 
75 
 
are unchangeable and everlasting. These parts are the main foundations of Islam; without 
them Islam is no longer Islam. On the other hand, there are some other parts in the Qurʼan 
as a result of the society and time in which the prophet was born and raised. He calls those 
parts as accidental (arazi). (Soroush 1989: 4-19). Although he does not separate essential 
parts from accidentals in every verse of sacred texts, he provides a criterion in separating 
essential parts from accidentals in the Qurʼan: this criterion is based on this knowledge 
about things that could have happened in other ways. For example, the principle of oneness 
and uniqueness of God (tawheed) is an essential part of the Qurʼan because it cannot have 
happened otherwise and without it, Islam is not actually Islam. However, it was an 
accidental of history that Muhammad was born in Arabia and therefore the language of the 
Qurʼan became Arabic language, which shaped the main conceptual framework of the 
Qurʼan (Soroush 1999: 21).  
He believes that most historical events that happened in the years of revelation rest in the 
domain of accidentals. In order to have access to the core message of the religion, which 
he calls essentials, we should translate historical events from past to present. In other 
words, we should differentiate between “historical Islam” and “the spirit of Islam”. In this 
regard, he refers to various items that can help us in reconstructing “historical Islam”. 
These items are additions to the sacred texts and are known as accidentals in his argument. 
For instance, he says that the particular language, particular concepts, and particular 
methods the prophet used to transfer the essence of religion to the people, as well as some 
questions and answers transmitted between the prophet and other Muslims, are among 
accidentals.   
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With this criterion, most parts of social rules on women’s issues rest in the realm of 
accidentals, since they could have happened in other ways if the prophet lived in other 
societies or in other times. Also, most parts of sacred texts are accidentals; just a limited 
part of these texts are essentials. In line with this explanation, Alireza Alavitabar said that 
not only the Arabic language and culture, but also scientific stories, historical events, and 
many stories in the Qurʼan and the prophet’s tradition, lie in the realm of accidentals and 
do not apply to this time (Alavitabar 2003).  
Reformers believe that the purpose of Islam was to talk about and accentuate the essential 
parts. Accidental parts are just related to the society and time in which the prophet was 
born and lived: 
“God’s revelation is like a muse, an “inspiration” for poets, and Muhammad 
transmitted this “inspiration,” in the language he knows, and the style his people 
understand, to reveal the essentials of the new religion of Islam, without doing 
without the accidentals, i.e. the socio-cultural circumstances that bound both the 
prophet and his community. If Muhammad lived in a different context, time and 
space, revelation could have been translated differently, but its core message would 
have been the same.”19  
Hence, according to the reformist discourse, the essential parts of sacred texts reveal the 
core message of Islam, which is permanent; the accidental parts are additions to the sacred 
19 This is a part of Michel Hoebik’s interview with Dr. Soroush on December 2007 under the name of “The 
word of Muhammad”. http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT- 
The%20Word%20of%20Mohammad.html. 
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texts that a believer in Islam must understand according to various contexts and 
circumstances. The accidental parts are fallible; in other words they are open to change 
according to various contexts. 
Soroush further proposed the notion of “minimalist religiosity” against the notion of 
“maximalist religiosity” as a supplemental commentary to “the theory of essential and 
accidentals in religion.” Soroush believes that religion does not say everything and 
believers should not expect too much of religion (Hashas, 2014). He has a minimalist 
perspective toward the elements of religion, like fiqh and ethics. He considers ethical values 
as objective, minimalist, accidental, and this-worldly (secular). He further continues that 
“fiqh is incomplete; it is perfect in terms or precepts (theory), and not in planning; it is 
minimalist, and not maximalist; it is not religion” (Soroush 2009: 100-1). Believers seek 
perfection and salvation in religion. They generally wish to find everything in religion. In 
other words, they look at religion as a maximal reservoir and source in which they can find 
appropriate answers for every question in their lives. However, it is not the purpose of 
religion to talk about everything. The main purpose of religion, according to the reformist 
perspective, is to talk about essentials. In fact, Islam has some rules regulating believers’ 
social lives. However, we should draw attention to the fact that these social rules are not 
maximal. Also, those rules should be modified to be employed in the present time. In the 
case of fiqh law, Soroush says that classical jurists extract maximums from minimums. 
They have changed fiqh rules to a final verdict regulating every aspect of believers’ lives, 
instead of making minimums adjustable to various circumstances and changeable 
according to the spirit of religion (Soroush 2009: 94-97). 
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It is because traditional jurists’ orientation toward religion, shariʼa, and ethics is 
otherworldly. The otherworldly view considers the rationale behind the Islamic law a 
Divine rationale or a Divine secret. This viewpoint sees Islamic laws as duties with the 
purpose of producing felicity in the hereafter. It loses the spirit of religion and focuses on 
the ultimate consequences of Islamic laws in the hereafter. Therefore, otherworldly 
oriented religion severs ties with the problems emerge from social affairs. It emphasizes 
believers’ duties, which have been assigned by Divine order and are reflected in Islamic 
laws.  
On the other side, reformists try to generally consider religion and shariʼa this-worldly, 
and not otherworldly. They try to make a link between the shariʼa and this world. In this-
worldly perspective, the rationale behind the Islamic laws is not a secret Devine rationale, 
rather it is believers’ social affairs and society’s needs. In this worldview, the main purpose 
of fiqh rules is to run social affairs and solve problems that emerge from them. Islamic laws 
are judged according to their immediate, and not ultimate, consequences.  
From the reformist perspective, Islamic laws are in general based on human rights, and not 
on human duties. Since Islamic laws are judged according to their immediate 
consequences, they are constantly subject to change and contestation. If they cannot satisfy 
believers’ needs, they have to be modified. This is the meaning of the historical translation 
of accidentals from the past to present. Islamic rules, which have regulated believers’ lives 
in the history of Islam, are accidentals of religion. They are not based on Divine order; 
instead are this-worldly and based on social order. Hence, they need to be modified 
constantly according to the present social affairs and current people’s needs. According to 
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this explanation, reformist discourse, in contrast to traditionalist discourse, not only defines 
gender roles, gender relations, and women’s rights out of the religious context, but also 
constantly modifies its definitions according to the changes in social conditions.  
However, reformists and feminists do not play a considerable role in making Islamic law 
in Iran. Extracting Islamic law from sacred texts is only in the hand of traditional jurists. It 
does not seem that traditionalists will include reformists in extracting Islamic law from 
sacred texts. Therefore, it is only the philosophy and epistemology of traditionalist 
discourse which defines assumptions underlying Islamic law Iran. In order to reach gender 
equality in Islamic law, the philosophy and epistemology of traditionalist discourse on 
gender relations and women’s rights should be modified.  
To modify the philosophy of traditionalist discourse, jurists should adopt a minimalist 
perspective toward the elements of religion, including fiqh and shariʼa. Traditionalists 
should not expect classical fiqh texts to regulate every aspect of human life. If traditional 
jurists’ orientation toward fiqh texts is minimal, most aspects of human life, including 
women’s issues, can be defined out of the religious context. Following the minimalist 
perspective, jurists can rely on the findings of medical sciences, as well as human sciences 
in defining women’s sexuality, gender relations, and gender roles. Moreover, if the 
majority of women’s issues are defined out of the Islamic context, the orientation toward 
these issues will be secular and this-worldly. From this-worldly perspective, Islamic laws 
are judged according to their immediate consequences, based on believers’ social affairs 
and society’s needs. This-worldly perspective toward fiqh and shariʼa opens more space 
for human rights and provides gender equality in Islamic laws.   
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